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3FOREWORD
The G20 is at a critical juncture. Either it moves forward shaping the way of a
new, more effective, global governance or it will become just another Gn where
discourses and solemn declarations take the lead over action. There is nothing
wrong in multiplying for where heads of states and governments meet all over
the planet. At the contrary exchanges of views on common problems and the
ways they are appraised in different countries may “à la longue” affect the
design of national policies. 
But, on one hand, after the crisis the G20 gave rise to high expectations,
which were almost met at its first meetings and, on the other hand, the
problems facing the world today are more urgent than ever, especially those
which need a persistent action to be resolved because they are of a long term
nature (development, climate change, inequalities, investment in democracy, to
name a few). 
The danger the world is facing today is that countries, forgetting that their
economies are strongly interdependent, are “renationalizing” their economic
policies, acting as if each of them were confronted with specific problems whose
solutions were without externalities for the other countries. The paradox of the
situation is that the feeling of urgency is disappearing at the very moment where
the problems are becoming more urgent, especially if we want to avoid both a
“remake” of the crisis and an acceleration of the destruction of a number of
global public goods. The responsibility of the G20 is thus considerable. It could
act in such a way that would allow us to get out of this situation, creating a
future where growth is more sustainable, friendlier to the environment, and
where its fruits would be distributed in a more equitable way, both within and
among countries. Otherwise, it will bear the responsibility before history of not
having done the duty which has been delegated to it, despite having been in
exceptional circumstances that gave it much more room for manoeuvre than it
would have had in 'normal' times. 
That is why a group of 'experts', with no commitments other that of being
citizens of the world, decided to meet to reflect on what could be done, hoping
that from their reflection some useful recommendations to the powerful of this
world would emerge. This group, which christened itself the Paris Group, has
been constituted at the invitation of the President of The French Republic, who
also presides over the destiny of the G20 this year.  The Chairmen were given
complete discretion in the choice of the membership of the group; their sole
responsibility was to gather a diverse group of individuals with the highest level
of expertise in the subjects confronting the G20 and with a commitment to
working to ensure the improvement in the system of global economic
governance.
The chapters which follow contain a summary of the discussion between the
members of the group and the preparatory notes which have been written by
them. 
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The following summarizes discussions and recommendations to the
President of the French Republic on the G20 agenda of a group of
economists representing Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the United
States, experts in virtually every arena of economics, from academia,
finance, government, and business (all, though, in their private capacities).
The members of the group have been selected freely by the chairmen and
there is a significant overlap between the composition of this group and
that of the UN Commission of Experts on Reforms of the International
Monetary and Financial system. The meeting of the group was hosted by
the Ministry of Economy, Industry and Employment at Bercy in Paris on
the 5th of January 2011. The group met on the 6th with the President of the
French Republic during a working lunch in order to report its main
conclusions and to openly discuss them.
The Urgency of the situation
The G20 is at a critical juncture.  The G20 enjoyed enormous success in
the response to the global economic crisis in late 2008 and early 2009. The
crisis was managed, and it was far from obvious that this would be the case,
especially given its severity and the prevailing doctrines in 2008, which
had in fact contributed to the crisis and its rapid spread around the world.
This was the crucial difference from the 1930s. In the heat of action,
dogmas that held back intervention were dumped much more quickly. It
was even understood that, in direct contrast to the policy of non-
cooperation adopted in the inter-war period, what was needed was the best
possible coordination at the global level, even if the institutions involvedTHE G20 AND RECOVERY AND BEYOND
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2008-2009 were thus marked by the rising influence of the G20 and the
relative decline of the G8, as well as by a growing awareness of the need for
governance that is truly global. In short, there was a global crisis that
required a global response and the G20 helped to give it: cooperative
actions to undertake strong stimulus and to avoid protectionist measures
helped avert turning the crisis into another Great Depression. Since then,
though, the sense of cohesion has evaporated. The early successes of the
G20 were based on a shared vision and shared interest: the entire world
faced the common threat of recession/depression, and there was a common
understanding that the only way to combat the downturn was strong
government action, both to save the banks and to stimulate the economy.
Since then, though, marked divisions in circumstances and perceptions
have arisen; some countries, mainly emerging countries, have returned to
robust growth, others are mired in high unemployment.  Some countries
face financial constraints, forcing austerity measures.  But among countries
not facing such constraints, some are nonetheless choosing austerity, in
the belief that such policies will restore growth; while others argue that
these policies will delay full recovery. Some in the developed countries
argue that policies in emerging markets are promoting growth in those
markets at the expense of jobs in the developed countries; others that the
policies in the developed countries aimed at restoring growth there
threaten to cause bubbles and instability in the emerging markets, and that
strong and stable growth in emerging markets are beneficial to the
developed countries. With such divergences in circumstances and
perceptions, it is hard to develop concerted policies. Moreover, there are
those who might benefit from the failure to achieve concerted action:
many in the financial market prefer the current situation with weak global
financial regulations.  
It is perhaps not a surprise, then, that some more recent meetings have
been a disappointment. If there are not some successes under the French
Presidency, the relevance of the G20 will come to be questioned. Under the
circumstances described above, agreements based on the least common
denominator are likely to be viewed as disappointing—not up to the tasks
facing the world.  
There are many factors that may explain the loss of cohesion among
countries, cohesion that seemed so strong in 2008-2009. Among them, two
are of particular importance in view of their possible impact on the design
of future policies. The first is the growing emphasis that is put on the
sustainability of public debts (even by those countries that have a sound
public finance situation), which as a consequence of the crisis have
CHAIRMEN’S SUMMARY 11increased sizably almost everywhere. The second is the shift of emphasis
from the demand to the supply side of the economy through
competitiveness concerns. The combination of both factors is increasing
the inward-looking character of national policies and thus their non-
cooperative potential.  Part of this evolution is actually doctrinal in nature.
The slogan “cherchez le supply” which was at the heart of the pre-crisis
doctrine is being rejuvenated. Devotees of this doctrine—who kept silent
during the brief return of Keynes on the political arena—are again raising
their heads, accusing governments of extravagant spending and of having
amassed unsustainable debts. The word Keynesian once again carries a
negative connotation, especially in Europe. 
What can be done? 
The Group focused on what it considered to be the central economic
issues: the current macro-economic situation, reforms in the global
financial and monetary system, climate change, financial sector reform,
development and global governance. In each area, it asked:  (a) Are there
broad visions for the future directions of the global system upon which
there can be consensus?  (b)  Are there some instances in processes can be
initiated that bring some aspects of the vision into reality?  (c)  Are there
some current actions, even of limited scope, upon which there can be some
agreement?  
As the discussion that followed evidenced, there was unanimity (or near
unanimity) among the group in several areas—a broadly shared
consensus—and yet, in the past, the governments of one, two, or three
countries have raised objections, preventing meaningful progress.  In some
of these instances, it may be possible to devise compromise solutions. In
others, this will not be possible. It is always difficult to persuade countries
that it is what is perceived to be in the global interest is in fact in their
national interest, even when it may appear not to be. Of course, the
rationale for global cooperation is that when there are important
externalities, it may not be in each country’s interest to narrowly pursue its
own shortsighted self-interest; the equilibrium that results from each
country doing that is inefficient—and this is why there is a need for global
collective action. 
The G20 cannot let the principle of unanimity lead to paralysis.  Rather, as it
recognizes that there may be such instances, it should also acknowledge
that sub-groupings should nonetheless proceed in coordinated and
cooperative actions, with arrangements that are open to the adhesion of
others, but with the broad understanding that others would not be coerced
THE G20 AND RECOVERY AND BEYOND12to join.  Such initiatives are already occurring, mainly around regional
blocs. But there are common interests that extend beyond a region, and the
G20 can be an important venue for exploring such initiatives. One might
expect that the success of these initiatives will put peer pressure on others
to join in these cooperative actions.1 After a “club” is constituted, the
advantages of joining the club are likely to become more obvious.
The crisis itself had called into question many longstanding and widely
held beliefs (which, however, were never unanimously shared) about
market economies. In particular, the crisis has made it clear that unfettered
markets are not necessarily efficient, stable, or self-correcting. Policies of
liberalization and deregulation predicated on those beliefs had contributed
to the crisis and its rapid spread around the world. Market failures,
including those associated with agency problems and externalities, are
pervasive. Social and private costs and benefits are often not well
aligned—and these distortions are particularly manifest in financial
markets, where not only may there be excessive risk taking, but there may
also be distorted incentives, including for innovation.  Yet, in some
countries and in some quarters, the full implications of the lessons of the
crisis had not been taken on board. The crisis was not merely a parenthesis-
-a brief interlude; the post-crisis world should not resemble the world as it
was. Yet there is great pressure to rewrite the story of this crisis by depicting
effects as if they were causes—most notably, accusing governments of
being guilty for having let the public debt increase.  We should not be
striving to return to the world as it was before the crisis; we should be
striving to create a better balance between markets and the state. 
Each country has a responsibility to address these issues in the context of
its own economy; but the G20 has the responsibility of addressing these
issues when cross-border externalities arise. And in a world of
globalization, these have become pervasive. 
Macroeconomic Coordination
The strong sense of the group was that 2011 was likely to be weaker,
overall, than 2010; that growth in Asia would remain strong, but that
China was likely to moderate its growth; that there were significant
downside risks for the United States and Europe as formal stimulus
packages come to an end—including a risk of continued turmoil in certain
financial markets; and that the United States and Europe were not likely to
return to anything approaching normal levels of unemployment any time
1. Even today, not all members of the G20 belong to the WTO.  
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underlined that it is the first time since World War II that both side of the
Atlantic are characterized by mass unemployment. 
Many of the problems that had led up to or contributed to the crisis have
so far not be adequately addressed; in some cases, the crisis has itself
exacerbated the problems.  In the U.S., for instance, bank lending remains
constrained, with especially adverse effects on small and medium sized
enterprises; mortgage foreclosures are continuing apace, with perhaps
2 million more expected in 2011, in addition to the nearly 7 million that
have already gone into foreclosure; housing prices are likely to
stagnate—with many predictions of further decreases. Concentration in
banking has increased. While there have been some improvements in bank
regulations, the group strongly held the view that what had been done so
far was inadequate (see discussion below)—neither up to the task of
preventing another crisis nor of getting the banks to return to their core
mission of sound lending, especially to SME’s (rather than gambling,
speculating, trading, predatory lending, or exploiting their monopoly
position over the payments mechanism). At the onset of the crisis,
governments acted properly in taking steps to save the banks, but they did
not take stock of the political consequences of doing so in ways that
seemingly increased existing inequities. To devote, even potentially, such
considerable sums to bail out the financial system--without demanding
genuine guarantees that this system would finally return to its public
mission of financing the public and private economy--might be justified as
a matter of urgency, but it was lacking in foresight. By now the financial
lobbies have regained their influence and their capacity to oppose
regulations which might have an adverse effect on their profits, even if
such regulations would contribute to the well-functioning of the financial
system. 
Underlying problems that contributed to weak global aggregate demand
have also been exacerbated. The UN Commission2 identified high levels of
inequality and high demand for reserves as two critical factors. High
unemployment has contributed to weakening labor’s bargaining position,
even as bonuses have been restored with remarkable rapidity.  In some
developed countries, governments are taking advantage of this situation to
pursue (pre-crisis) programs aimed at increasing flexibility in the labor
market and reducing social protection, even though such measures helped
2. Joseph E. Stiglitz and Members of a UN Commission of Experts, Reforming the
International Monetary and Financial Systems in the Wake of the Global Crisis (The
Stiglitz Report), New York:  The New Press, 2010
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there is a risk of increasing the already high levels of inequality, at least in
some countries.  
The marked increase in reserves that began at the end of the last century
has also weakened global aggregate demand. Money that countries put
aside in reserves is money that they are not spending. Reserve build-up
continued, too—encouraged, perhaps, by the fact that those countries with
large reserves were in a better position to respond to the crisis.  
This discussion of global reserves illustrates the importance of global
externalities in the determination of the global macro-economic
equilibrium. Actions by one country can have unintended adverse effects
on others. Discussions of the Great Depression highlighted these
externalities, as beggar-thy-neighbor policies contributed to that
downturn. The success (significant, but far from perfect) of the G20 in
encouraging resistance to protectionism controlled this form of
externality, but externalities remain pervasive: Growth by one country can
be of benefit to others. That was one of the arguments for a coordinated
Keynesian stimulus. The reverse is also true: austerity in one country has
spillovers in others. So too, the failure of one country to regulate
adequately its financial sector imposed huge costs on others around the
world; the failure to do so in the aftermath of the crisis means that the risks
of the imposition of such external costs persists.  In a world of
globalization, an increase in liquidity in one country can have effects in
others—the recipient of the funds need not spend the money in the
country creating the liquidity.  Indeed, it is even possible that the main
effects lie elsewhere. In the absence of coordination, countries will focus on the
domestic effects of policies, without regard to the external effects. Since global
multipliers from fiscal spending are larger than national multipliers, this
means, for instance, that fiscal stimuli in a global downturn are likely to be
smaller.  
It is remarkable that governments which have promoted free trade and
globalization seem so often to disregard the consequences of the increased
interdependence between their economies.  
In these circumstances, the Group felt strongly that it was imperative
that governments in Europe and America maintain strong sustainable
growth policies—beyond what they might do on their own. Countries like
the United States, Germany or France, that can borrow at low interest rates
and have high return public investment opportunities (in education,
infrastructure, technology, etc) should do so, even if that requires
increasing the short-run deficits. Such investments can not only lower
CHAIRMEN’S SUMMARY 15unemployment and increase growth, but also might even lower the
medium-term national debt-to-GDP ratio, as GDP is increased and
increased tax revenues more than offset increased interest payments. After
all, unconventional and innovative measures with attendant risks
undertaken to bail out financial institutions avoided the collapse of
financial markets. Similar determined exploration of unconventional and
innovative measures with attendant risks must be undertaken to revive
growth and employment. But even conventional approaches—focusing
spending on high return investments—are likely, at least in those countries
with access to finance, to lead both to higher growth and lower debt GDP
ratios in the medium to long run.  
It will be critical to recycle savings to areas of high returns.  There exists a
largely misguided formulation of the world’s problem as arising from a
surplus of savings (say in China) with the concomitant response of
encouraging China to consume more. The world needs more investment to
address the myriad of problems it faces—including responding to climate
change and poverty and adapting to the large structural changes (e.g.
urbanization) it is experiencing.  The crisis was not caused by an excess of
savings, but by the failure of private financial markets to channel savings to
areas of high social return. Figuring out how to do this is one of the key
challenges facing the G20.
 (a) Part of that task involves creating institutional arrangements for
sharing risk—so those with the savings don’t have to bear the risk,
and aren’t induced simply to lend to the United States.
(b) Part of the task involves creating specialized investment funds, to
create the specialized knowledge and financial instruments for
undertaking these investments.
(c) In the arena of investments for climate change, it will be essential to
create a high price of carbon.
Sometimes it is argued that issues of climate change or promoting
development should be postponed; the focus in Europe and the U.S. (so it is
argued) should be on economic recovery. The Group believes that that
view is wrong.  Investments in these areas can and should be at the center
of the recovery. They may even be at the origin of a new wave of
technological progress increasing growth potential. Economic recovery
and addressing climate change are complements, not substitutes.  
In assessing both short- and long-term performance, we have to further
develop and put into more extensive use better measures of economic
performance and social progress, measures which take into account, for
instance, not only per capita  GDP, but also correctly measured household
THE G20 AND RECOVERY AND BEYOND16income and its distribution and sustainability. It is, accordingly, important
for the G20 to express its support for the work instigated by the
International Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance
and Social Progress. Such measures would show, for instance, that even
before the crisis, in some countries which seemed to be showing growth,
most citizens were seeing declining or stagnating incomes. Such measures
would have revealed, at least in some circumstances, that the growth that
was occurring was based on mounting debt, and that there was at least a
substantial risk of lack of sustainability.  
The Commission, in its work, emphasized too that we needed to develop
broader measures of well-being. Employment and decent work as well as
economic security are important, not just for the income generated, but
also for the sense of dignity and self-respect that it supports.  
Recent G20 meetings have focused on global imbalances.  It is natural, of
course, for some people or countries to borrow, at any one moment, and
others to lend.  The question is, are there indicators of, say, unsustainable
(or unreasonable) imbalances. When oil prices are unusually high,
countries putting aside some of their money for a rainy day should be
commended for having high savings. While the Group appreciated the
difficulty of ascertaining what good indicators are, they felt it would be a
mistake not to adequately take into account employment and inequality
(e.g. countries facing a temporarily high level of unemployment would be
justified in having high fiscal deficits, even if such deficits led to high trade
imbalances). Financial markets often look at an excessively narrow set of
indicators—and often the wrong indicators. No one would look at a firm
and simply comment on its increased indebtedness. The focus is on the
balance sheet.  But financial markets typically look excessively narrowly at
the indebtedness of firms. So too, focusing the attention on the level of
fiscal deficits, without taking notice of the level of unemployment or how
money is spent  misleadingly shifts the emphasis from ultimate objectives
to intermediate ones, and gives a misleading account of sustainability. 
The G20 should work to create better measures of economic as well as
environmental and social sustainability, including creating frameworks for
government and national capital accounts.  While it may be difficult to clearly
identify what investments are, the current treatment—which fails to
consider any government expenditures as investment--is clearly wrong.  
There is a general sense that Central Bank coordination—especially in
the immediate aftermath of the crisis—was impressive.  Yet, just as the
sense of cohesion on fiscal policy has frayed as the crisis has moved into
recovery, so too in monetary policy. The strong sense of the Group was that
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adverse effects on emerging markets which the United States did not seem
to fully take into account (consistent with the general theories outlined
earlier).  Nor was the United States fully taking into account the
implications for the evolution of the global financial system.  Countries are
responding to resist the appreciation of their real exchange rates not only
with (sometimes costly) interventions, but also with taxes, controls, etc.
These not only obviate some of the hoped-for exchange rate effects of US
monetary policy (just as others’ tariff policies undid the effects of beggar-
thy-neighbor tariff polices); but they lead to a more fragmented global
financial market. While for critics of globalization, this fragmentation is
welcome, it is ironic that one of the strongest advocates of global financial
market integration should be partially responsible for this fragmentation.
The G20 needs to articulate a clearer vision of how globalization leads to
interdependence, increasing the importance of externalities; and while
such externalities are universal, they are likely to be particularly
significant on the part of large countries, and particularly significant, in
the area of monetary policy, on the part of the reserve currency country
(or countries.)
Reforming the Global Monetary and Financial System
The world has faced repeated monetary and financial crises.  In the forty
years since the world left the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system,
the international system has evolved in a way that is markedly different
from the way that free market advocates like Milton Friedman envisaged. It
has been marked by high levels of instability, ever more frequent and
severe crises, requiring international bailouts of increasing size. A global
reserve system based on the currency of a single country is an anomaly in
the increasingly globalized world of the 21st century. Keynes and Triffin
anticipated that the system would be rife with problems, and there is a
growing consensus that that is the case.  While some in the United States
see the advantage of seignorage, the ability to borrow at extraordinarily low
interest rates—and therefore resist a change—even for the United States,
there are marked disadvantages to the current arrangements.  Everyone
loses from the high levels of instability; but even more, if others increase
their holdings of US dollars, it results in a trade deficit, and the excess of
imports over exports weakens aggregate demand in the United States and
contributes negatively to growth.  In the past, fiscal deficits (or loose
monetary policy) could compensate; in the current situation (and in the
foreseeable future) that may be difficult.
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the global financial system. There are four parts to such a comprehensive
re-examination (beyond the coordinated reform of national regulatory
systems).
(a) The Reserve System.  The current system contributes to lack of global
aggregate demand (as countries put aside hundreds of billions of
dollars in reserves each year—money which is not spent) and is
unstable and inequitable, with poor countries lending trillions of
dollars to the reserve currency countries, at low (now close to zero)
interest rates. A global reserve system can partially ameliorate these
problems. As the UN Commission emphasized, there are many
variants of such a system—more ambitious versions can be used to
promote stability and address problems of global public goods, less
ambitious versions can simply address the deficiencies in current
arrangements. There are also a variety of institutional arrangements
and various ways that the transition from the current system to the
new system can be managed.  
Among the variants discussed by the UN Commission there is one in
particular that may be of especial relevance to the G20 discussion. It
is conceivable that the current reserve currency country may not see
that it is in its interests to move toward a global system; it may wish
to continue what it sees as its privileged position, and will
accordingly put roadblocks to the creation of an alternative. The
G20 cannot let any country obstruct the creation of an alternative
system. There are alternatives in which a group of countries works
together to create a reserve system. Indeed, such arrangements
already exist. One approach is to extend and strengthen these
arrangements.  
The Group felt strongly that The G20 should create a process of
examining these alternatives, with the intent of instigating
reforms in the reserve system as soon as possible. Reforms can be
sequential, with successes at one stage contributing to further
reforms. Thus, building on the successes in the expansion of SDR’s
in the London G20 meeting, The G20 should commit itself in the
interim to regular SDR emissions.  The effectiveness of these SDR
emissions would be increased if certain constraints on their use (e.g.
for IMF lending) were eliminated, and if those without need for
more reserves (e.g. countries with large reserves and persistent
surpluses) could and would transfer their allocations to, say,
developing countries.  
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from a dollar to a dollar-euro system. It may move to a three or four
reserve currency system. Such a system, however, would not solve
any of the problems noted earlier; it may (and in the view of many
of the members of the group is likely to) be even more unstable, with
increasing volatility of exchange rates. The problems of
insufficiency of aggregate demand and inequities would persist, and
the problem that monetary policy authorities of reserve currency
countries pay insufficient attention to the consequences of their
actions could be exacerbated. In short, unless the G20 address this
issue frontally, there is a significant risk that the world will move to
an even more dysfunctional system.
(b) Exchange rate determination. The vision that many had the Bretton
Woods system came to an end was that farsighted markets would
lead to stable exchange rates, which would adjust gradually and
efficiently as economic circumstances changed. That was, of course,
before the days of massive short-term capital flows and high levels of
speculative activity using new financial instruments. Similarly,
before the Argentinean crisis, many argued for the bipolar view:
countries should either have fixed or freely flexible exchange rate
(the two systems have in common a belief that there should be no
discretionary government intervention). Today, most countries
recognize that there are at least times where they should intervene,
and that exchange rates are affected by a host of government
policies, from interest rates, to financial market regulations, to
government bank guarantees, etc. Whether such policies are
adopted with the intent of affecting the exchange rate is not the
question; countries often deny that they do so. The fact is that
change in the exchange rate is one of the important (general
equilibrium) effects, and indeed, in the case of monetary policy, one
of the main channels through which effects of various policies is
felt. Thus, the G20 should put to rest the shibboleth that the
solution to international economic problems entails allowing free
market determined exchange rates.  As we noted earlier, one of the
main lessons of the crisis is that market prices may neither be
efficient nor stable.  
(c) Management of cross-border capital flows. Another lesson of the
crisis is that unfettered financial markets are neither efficient nor
stable. There needs to be financial sector regulation. But,
remarkably, the question of regulation of cross border capital flows
has been largely omitted from the discussion. In response to large
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(some related to monetary policy in reserve countries), already
countries are engaged in a variety of interventions to prevent
distortionary and costly currency appreciations.  Experience in prior
crises (such as that in East Asia at the end of the previous century)
showed that short term capital flows could be very destabilizing and
help precipitate a crisis. Research has corroborated that these short
term flows do not necessarily enhance growth and may in fact have
adverse effects on growth as well as stability, and are not necessary
to bring about long term investments.  In spite of this research and the
lessons of the crisis, many international and bilateral agreements impose
restrictions on countries’ ability to adopt regulations that enhance capital
account management.  The G20 should expressly acknowledge the
importance of capital account management, especially in periods
of economic stress, and should initiate a process of review of all
international agreements to ascertain when such agreements
interfere with countries’ ability to engage in capital account
management. 
(d) Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism. Previous sovereign debt
restructurings have, in many cases, been disorderly, imposing
excessive costs. The G20 should initiate a process for designing a
sovereign debt restructuring mechanism.  While the IMF may have
an important voice in these deliberations, it should be recognized
that as a major creditor, and as an institution controlled by creditor
countries, it cannot be at the center. The process must have equal
representation from debtor and creditor groups.
Climate Change
As noted earlier, the Group strongly believed that actions addressing
climate change could and should be part of the strategy for economic
recovery. In addition to the concrete actions described earlier, creating a
risk facility to support the recycling of surpluses from surplus and reserve
countries to finance climate change in developing countries, other
mechanisms of innovative finance should be pursued (see below under
development).  
In addition, the G20 should continue articulating the imperative of
responding to the challenge of climate change, particularly by noting the
quantitative implications in terms of emissions per capita of
commitments made earlier concerning limiting global warming to 2
degrees centigrade. 
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commitments concerning climate change, including those concerning the
use of compulsory licenses for the transfer of technology and actions
related to terrestrial carbon (REDD), but in some cases, impediments have
arisen to their full and effective implementation. The G20 has an oversight
role in global governance, and in that role, the G20 should establish a
process to identify and rectify impediments to the full implementation of
existing agreements.
Knowledge is a public good, and the development of technology to
increase carbon efficiency is, in that sense, a double public good.  There will
be underinvestment in   climate change research by the private sector,
especially in the current context where carbon is vastly underpriced.  The
G20 should establish a process for creating a global research fund for
climate change.
It makes sense that the richest countries and the largest polluters
contribute most to the funds, but once technologies for reducing carbon
emissions are discovered, it is in the world’s interest that these technologies
receive the most widespread use.  That means that newly developed
technologies should be made freely available to developing countries, and
perhaps to all countries that have contributed to the fund.
Meanwhile, some countries are using trade policy to impede other
countries taking more effective actions, asserting that industrial policies to
promote green technologies are an unfair trade action. The G20 should
acknowledge the superiority of collective research efforts-- with extensive
dissemination of the fruits of that research through low or zero royalties.
It should also hold that until a fully effective international consortium is
established, countries should be encouraged to promote the development
of green technologies, whether through government sponsored research or
industrial policies, so long as the country agrees to comply with provisions
of earlier  agreements on compulsory licensing for developing countries.
Financial Sector Reform
The consensus among the Group was that there were important
deficiencies in actions taken thus far to curb the kind of behavior of the
financial sector that contributed to the crisis, and other aspects of the
behavior of the financial sector which undermine its ability to fulfill the
economic roles that it should play in our societies. The Group urged the
G20 to take on board several issues that so far have been given short shrift.
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subject to intensive and close supervision, of the kind not evidenced prior
to the crisis) present a systemic risk to the global financial system and the
global economy, because of their incentives for excessive risk taking. Such
institutions are also effectively subsidized, as a result of their access to
funds at lower interest rates, creating a dysfunction dynamic, in which
they grow ever larger.  While resolution authority was desirable, it is clearly
not the solution, especially in the case of financial institutions that operate
across borders. So to, additional capital provisions are necessary, but not
sufficient to address the gamut of problems that have been identified.
There needs to be tighter regulation and more intense supervision in a
number of dimensions, both nationally and globally.  
1. The question is not just whether governments have resolution
authority, but whether in the midst of a crisis governments are likely
to use the authority that they have to force bondholders and
shareholders to bear full losses; the persistence of differential
interest rates suggests that the market believes that they will not. 
2. The Group emphasized, however, that while there has been
inadequate attention paid to too big to fail banks, it is not the only
problem. Large numbers of institutions undertaking correlated
behavior can pose a systemic risk to the global economy, even if all
of them are small.
3. Several of the key problems posed by CDS’s and other derivatives
have not been adequately addressed.  This includes:  (a) whether
they are viewed as insurance products or gambling instruments, it
makes no sense for them to be underwritten by governments, as
they are when they are written by government insured banks.  (b)
Only a portion of them have become transparent, as they move to
clearing houses.  (c)  But moving to clearing houses will not resolve
ongoing concerns unless they are adequately capitalized and they
and their governance are transparent.
4. Basel 3 (referred to as Basel 2 Plus) doesn’t adequately address the
problems that the crisis brought out.  There was no convincing
evidence that, had it been in place, the current crisis would have
been avoided. There appears to be continued reliance on rating
agencies and self-assessment of risk. Moreover, the long time
allowed before full implementation means that even if it were
adequate, the global system will be exposed to continuing risk in
coming years, possibly even more so as banks may attempt to
undertake even more risk in the periods before full implementation.
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by incentive structures in the financial sector, especially as they lead
to excessive risk taking.  Given the obvious role that such incentive
structures may have played in creating the crisis, which has had
such devastating effects on so many citizens, the failure to do so is
having an enervating effect on many democracies, as they come to
believe that political processes are dominated by financial interests.
Taxpayers in many, if not most, of the countries engaged in massive
bailouts have the impression that the banks got an unfairly good
deal, and they were handed a bad one:  the banks could continue to
pay out (in the US) dividends and bonuses—on which they often
pay unfairly low taxes; the increased concentration in the sector
enhanced profits—forcing borrowing to pay much higher interest
rates than the rates at which the banks could borrow (the spread
increased). That meant that the benefits of record low levels of T-bill
rates didn’t trickle down to the real sector—those who have to create
the new jobs to get the economy going.  Banks’ political investments
paid off once again more than their economic investments, and
their political power bounced back faster than their balance sheets
returned to health. Those in finance are putting increasing pressure
on governments not only not to regulate, but to cut public
spending. 
6. The financial systems’ monopoly on the electronic means of
payment has been widely abused, effectively imposing a tax on most
transactions between consumers and producers, the revenues of
which do not, however, go to public purpose but enrich the
financial sector. Some countries have shown that curtailing these
abuses can be relatively easy. The G20 should curb these monopoly
practices and consider substituting in part the monopoly tax with
a tax to be used for climate change and development.  
7. The G20, in earlier meetings, focused on how cross border capital
flows undermined the tax system.  But it has also facilitated
corruption, with money flowing from poor countries to accounts
protected by secrecy, in both off shore and on shore financial
centers. There needs to be a commitment not only to more
transparency, but to repatriation of such funds when they are
identified. The Group reiterated the concerns expressed by the UN
Commission, and subsequently bolstered by others, that work of the
G20 on uncooperative jurisdictions was not as transparent,
balanced, or comprehensive as it might have been.  It is not just
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financial centers have been identified as posing problems. 
The G20 needs to be sensitive, as it goes about the task of overseeing
reforms of the global financial system that assert the importance of
transparency--especially given the large role played in the G20 by the
countries with the largest financial centers, which were responsible for the
global financial crisis itself.   
The Development Agenda
The Group welcomed the initiatives of the G20 at Seoul, and most
believed that it should continue to push forward on a Development
Agenda. One member, perhaps reflecting sentiments of many in the
developing world, questioned the legitimacy of the G20’s efforts in this
area, given the lack of representation of less developed countries and given
the failure of the representatives of the advanced industrial countries to
live up to their commitments on aid.
The G20 made laudable efforts to ensure funds were provided to help
developing countries respond to the crisis, especially in the London 2009
meeting. The quick recovery of the emerging markets and the impact that
that has had on commodity prices has meant that the severity of the crisis
in most developing countries was not as bad as was feared.  Yet the crisis
made clear the limited coping capacity of the developing countries, the
inadequacies of current resources, and the risks of depending on private
markets for investments, even in areas like infrastructure, where they have
at times played an important role.
The Group strongly urged that the G20 should continue its work on
innovative finance, and even if there cannot be agreement among all
countries, efforts should be undertaken  (along the lines of some that
have already been undertaken) to ensure that some measures be
adopted—coordinated by groups of countries—as soon as possible.  The
Group was particularly supportive of a financial transactions tax, which
now seems to have mustered large support from the citizens of a large
number of countries, and versions of which have already been adopted by
some countries.  
Research in recent years has identified a number of versions of taxes on
the financial sector that could both raise considerable amounts of revenue
and increase economic efficiency, undoing some of the distortions
currently associated with the financial sector.  
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pollution) than good things (like work and savings); there are large social
costs associated with speculative activities; and a small financial
transactions tax would effectively differentiate between short term
speculation (where it could represent a large fraction of the returns), and
long term investments, where the tax would have a negligible effect.  The
tax could raise substantial amounts of money.  
Another innovative source of finance could be the issuance of SDR’s, as
recently discussed in the IMF.  
One source of particular concern is lack of funding for social protection.
The G20 should consider funding a contingency fund for developing
countries that put in place appropriately designed social protection
systems.
Another source of concern is more permanent funding of infrastructure
and trade finance.  As noted, private sector funding cannot be relied upon.
It can disappear just when it is most needed, putting developing countries
in a most vulnerable place.    
Funding is necessary but not sufficient for development.  Trade policy is
important too.  Since the beginning of the Doha round nearly a decade ago,
much of the Development Agenda has been weakened. It is, for instance,
important that the developed countries open themselves up unilaterally to
the least developed countries and that there be binding commitments for
aid-for-trade, so that developing countries can avail themselves of the
opportunities afforded by trade liberalization.
With so many new players in the provision of development assistance,
coordination will become increasingly difficult, but important. The G20
should work to ensure the effective use of funds provided.
In the era of budget stringency in which the advanced industrial
countries seems to be moving, it is imperative that aid budgets not only be
maintained, but increased, as countries work to fulfill their commitments
to provide .7% of GDP. The G20 should renew its commitment to provide.
7% of GDP for assistance to the poorest countries, and it will be
particularly important to guard against the risk of diverting increasing
amounts of funds to political agendas only tangentially related to helping
the poorest countries (e.g. to the war in Afghanistan.).
Many of the most troublesome countries are those with failed states.
Donors are often hesitant to provide assistance to such countries, lest they
appear to be supporting the corrupt dictators at the top.  But not to provide
assistance to such countries condemns the citizens of those countries to
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of education and health and other public services normally funded
partially or totally with such assistance.  This will make the opposition,
when it comes into power, less effective, and may even impede the process
of transition itself.  Donors need to find delivery mechanisms for providing
assistance directly to people—when states allow it, as many do--in ways
that enhance civil society and individual capacities.   
Reforming Global Governance
The G20 was an important step forward, in comparison to the G8.  Most
of the important global issues could not be addressed without participation
of at least the emerging markets.  If the G20 proves effective, many of the
concerns with the G20 may become more muted.  Among these are that,
even though around three-quarters of global GDP and more than 60 per
cent of the world population are represented, 172 countries are not
members, and there is a certain capriciousness concerning the
membership; it lacks representativeness and political legitimacy. There is
only one African country—South Africa. There is also concern of the
impact of the G20 on other international organizations, when it appears
that a group (albeit with a large fraction of the voting shares) makes
decisions that it can effectively impose on the entire organization. At the
same time, in certain critical areas, like climate change, where it might be
hoped that intense discussions among a small group might be able to craft
a global deal, the G20 has failed to do so.  
The Group supported a two-pronged approach. The G20 should openly
recognize the limitations on legitimacy and representation and the
potential problems posed to the governance of other international
institutions, and set up a process to address these issues. At the same
time, it should work to bring itself more formally within the framework of
the United Nations System.  On representation, for instance, the example
of the Security Council might be followed, with permanent representation
by the largest economies, combined with regional representation on an
elected but rotating basis. The G20 might see itself evolve toward the
Global Economic Coordinating Council called for by the UN Commission.
The UN Commission articulated some of the considerations that ought to
be borne in mind in the design of the GECC, including size, diversity,
continuity, and legitimacy.
But the Group recognized that these reforms might take considerable
time. In the meantime, the Group suggested three more immediate
measures. 
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inviting representatives from the AU and ILO—are welcome, but there was
concern that they be actively involved in the deliberative processes on a
permanent basis. The G20 should invite the AU to have a representative
on the G20 on par with the other members, and that the ILO should be
given the same status as the IMF.
The Group supported the recommendation of the UN Commission for
the creation of a scientific advisory council to the G20, which might help
set the agenda, identify problems in the system of global economic, social,
and political governance, and lay out alternative approaches to their
resolution.  
Repeatedly, as the G20 set about its tasks, it has had to call upon the
OECD for advise, e.g. on uncooperative jurisdictions. While the move from
G20 to G8 has brought on board voices from the emerging markets (but not
the least-developed countries), it seems an anomaly that when technical
advice is sought, there is such reliance on an organization of the advanced
industrial countries (and even the IMF is an organization that, at least in
formal governance, is dominated by the advanced industrial countries).
The G20 should set in motion a process for the creation of an
organization which will perform for emerging markets and the least-
developed countries the same task OECD is performing for the
industrialized countries.  It would be designed to work closely with the
OECD on problems of global significance, for example by jointly setting up
a World Global Governance Institute.  
Many of the initiatives the G20 has undertaken in recent years have
involved “variable geometry”: bringing to the table various parties whose
interests center around the particular issue under discussion. This was true,
for instance, in the formulation of the Development Agenda.  As the G20
agenda gets extended, maintaining and extending these practices will be of
increasing importance. It will also be important to maintain transparency
in the processes, if they are to maintain legitimacy.  
Many of the policy and governance reforms and initiatives discussed in
this note can be more easily conducted at the regional level. The G20
should encourage the evolution of regional arrangements, so long as they
are not designed to—and do not have the effect of—undermining the
multilateral system.  
The agenda the Group discussed, while comprehensive, was far from
exhaustive. Many issues have been left aside. In particular, the important
issue of commodity price stabilization—which in the light of current
evolution is becoming of real concern--has not been dealt with.
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especially those of agricultural goods, because of their consequences on
food prices. Recent events in many developing countries are teaching us
the gravity of their social consequences. Can we devise methods to help
stabilize these prices, or is such an objective out of reach? Nor have we
addressed the issue of the needed reform of existing international
institutions, for example. We leave that and other issues to future work,




The notes presented here have served as background materials for the
discussion during the first meeting of the Paris Group. Most of them are dealing
with several of the issues we proposed for discussion, including cross-cutting
issues. They are thus not arranged according to the structure of the chairmen’s
summary. They represent a collection of short papers dealing with some of the
most important problems of our time. They thus help to get an insight into the
major issues of the G20 agenda. THE G20 AND RECOVERY AND BEYOND
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The G20 enjoyed a moment of enormous success in the response to the
global economic crisis in late 2008 and early 2009. Cooperative actions to
undertake strong stimulus and to avoid protectionist measures helped
avert turning the crisis into another Great Depression. Since then, though,
the sense of cohesion seems to have evaporated, leading some to question
even the relevance of the G20. This note attempts to explain the
momentary success and the subsequent failures. It suggests an alternative
framework for discussions, and then to apply that framework to the central
problem facing the world today, how to prevent a growing global divide
with the associated tensions, with Europe and the United States sliding into
a long term malaise, while Asia enjoys robust growth.
The underlying problems
The early successes of the G20 were based on a shared vision and shared
interest: the entire world faced the common threat of recession/depression,
and there was a common understanding that the only way to combat the
downturn was strong government action, both to save the banks and to
stimulate the economy. There is little evidence that any country reshaped
its actions significantly in response to the G20, but the meetings reinforced
leaders’ convictions of the need to take strong actions and commitments
not to undertake protectionism.  
Since then, though, marked divisions in circumstances and perceptions
have arisen. The moment when there was a consensus that “we are all
Keynesians” quickly passed, aided and abetted by the looming deficits
(caused largely by the economic downturns.) Whether leaders espouse theTHE G20 AND RECOVERY AND BEYOND
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growth really believe these ideas (for which there is virtually no empirical
support), or they are simply reflecting the beliefs of voters and particular
interest groups, it is hard to develop concerted policies when (a)
circumstances differ so markedly, with some countries facing inflationary
pressures, others facing the prospects of unacceptably high unemployment;
and (b) perceptions differ so markedly, with some countries believing that
the best way to recover is to cut spending, others believing the best way is to
increase spending.
There is another problem, and that is the way countries interacted before
the crisis to reach an agreement—and especially the way developed
countries interacted with emerging markets. Countries lectured each other
too much. The United States, as the putatively most successful country,
would lecture others about how they should reform their economies if they
were to have strong growth. The United States was the teacher, the
emerging market the student. The United States would describe the reforms
as helping the emerging market country—as being in that country’s best
interest. And according to the American lecture, it was coincidental that
the reforms were also advantageous to the United States and other
industrial countries. If growth was enhanced, the argument went, everyone
benefitted  
To the extent that there was a negotiation, it was unbalanced. This was
evident in the Grand Bargain that underlay the Uruguay Round
negotiations, where the developing countries fulfilled their part of the deal,
but the advanced industrial countries still have not upheld their end (the
reduction in agricultural subsidies).  
When the lectures alone didn’t work, threats were invoked—the
imposition of tariffs, the withdrawal of some benefit. Those in emerging
markets were never sure about whether the threats would be carried out or
the magnitude of the effects if they were; but political leaders typically
didn’t want to bear the risk, especially given the widespread belief that
coups could be engineered, opposition parties could receive financial
support, etc. Agreements were reached, but not on the basis of trust and
equality.  
The crisis exposed weaknesses in the institutional frameworks in some of
the advanced industrial countries and undermined the credibility of their
economic advice. As a result, this mode of interaction between industrial
countries and emerging markets simply won’t work any longer. Moreover,
with the growth of trade agreements, the scope for trade sanctions has been
GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 35diminished. With the growth of democracies, threats can backfire:
electorates may demand that their governments not appear to be giving
into outside pressure. It was a system that was often resented before the
crisis, and was growing increasingly ineffective.  But today, this mode of
interaction has to be discarded, added to the dustbin of history.
All negotiations are based on give-and-take, attempting to find areas of
agreement and concessions—concessions in which the sacrifices of the
conceding party are of less value than the gains to the other parties.   
There is one more explanation of the difficulties encountered by the
G20, and that is institutional. The G20 is supposed to provide a framework
where leaders can come together and exchange views, helping to overcome
bureaucratic impediments. There are two difficulties with this “vision” of
the G20 process.  The first is that, in fact, most of the work leading up to
G20 meetings is conducted through its own “bureaucratic” process, which,
depending on the country, may be more or less connected with the
governmental structures that will be relied upon to implement it. Secondly,
in some countries, leaders may feel uncomfortable with making any
commitment that has not passed through appropriate channels. The result
of these two difficulties is that in practice there is little room for real
substantive and spontaneous give-and-take in the leaders’ meeting.  
An alternative would be for the leaders to focus on medium to longer
term “vision” issues, with the bureaucratic processes being charged with
developing concrete initiatives to translate these visions into practice.
As an example, the leaders might discuss the risks of excessively
consumption-oriented societies, and the role that new measures of
economic performance and social progress might play in assessing
performance and redirecting resources. The leaders might provide impetus
not only to this kind of initiative, but draw attention to particular
issues—such as inequality or insecurity or employment—that could be the
focus of programmatic work going forward.
As another example of the difference between the old and the new
frameworks, take the adjustment of China’s exchange rate. Discussions
often begin by explaining to China that having an undervalued exchange
rate is against Chinese interests. But China believes that it knows its own
economic situation better than American officials. China consults widely
with economists in and outside of China, and knows that many American
economists have markedly different views than those of U.S. officials.
China has, for instance, instruments for controlling inflation that may not
be available in advanced industrial countries. (The irony that American
officials repeatedly lectured China on the problems in its banking
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responsible for the global crisis—has been well-noted.) Now, China’s
economists explain how a too-rapid appreciation of the currency will lead
to high unemployment in China and economic instability—a result that,
they explain, will be in neither China’s interests nor those of the global
economy.
What matters is the adjustment of the real exchange rate, and that can be
accomplished either by an adjustment of the nominal exchange rate or an
adjustment of internal prices, e.g. through increases in domestic wages.
The latter has more subtlety, allowing smaller increases in wages where
those adjustments would avoid the large employment impacts of large
adjustments in nominal wages. (Of course, in the presence of perfect
flexibility of wages and prices and perfect and complete contracting, there
is no difference between the two—and no reason that the United States
couldn’t make its own adjustment through decreases in domestic wages
and prices. These “imperfections” explain both why the US does not want
to impose deflation on itself, and also why China might not want to
confront all of its firms with an increase in the nominal exchange rate.)
When China fails to be convinced that increasing the exchange rate is in
its interest, the United States resorts to threats. Congress threatens to
impose a tariff. The United States (and others) attempt to use arguments of
equity: it is unfair to others for China to manipulate its exchange rate. But
fairness, like beauty, lies in the eyes of the beholder. In response, it is
pointed out: (a) low interest rates (quantitative easing) impose costs on
others and “artificially” depresses the U.S. exchange rate; and (b) high
agricultural subsidies hurt China’s poor farmers, and a low exchange rate is
a way of partially countervailing these subsidies. Other methods (such as
China providing countervailing subsidies to its farmers) would take away
scarce money that could be used to promote education, health,
development and other social objectives. Within much of the developing
world, these arguments have some resonance. 
There is a way out of this impasse, and that is for the G20 to adopt a global
growth compact. This is a framework which represents a Pareto
improvement for all countries, enforced by much self-interest, and which
reflects each country’s sensibilities about their own economy and “fairness.”
Symmetry is of the essence in this global growth compact, both for
macroeconomic policies in the short run, and for structural policies in the
long run. In a context of global demand deficiency, asking for adjustments
only from countries facing a problem (whether of debt or of balance of
payment, or both) is a recipe for deepening the deficiency. In a context
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help the world economy to lecture emerging and developing economies on
the benefits of free trade. Symmetry implies, too, that a national currency
can’t be any more than the international reserve currency. In an
environment of persistently high unemployment, it would not help the
recovery of the world economy for deficit countries to raise their taxes, say,
on labor. If taxes are to be raised, a carbon tax—all the better if it is
global—is a much better option. To sum up, symmetry would serve both
equity and efficiency. 
Hence, the key ingredients to this sustainable global growth compact are
the following:
 — All countries with the fiscal and economic space to undertake
expansionary policies do so. Otherwise there will be a (structural)
restrictive bias in global macroeconomic policies, as only those
countries considered as having an unsustainable public finance
situation would be required to adjust. And it can’t adjust but
downward. 
As growth occurs, countries with trade surpluses take actions to reduce
those trade imbalances, in ways that they believe are consistent with their
short- and long-term objectives. This will normally entail exchange rate
realignments. But it would be mutually recognized that sometimes so-
called market-determined exchange rates may not be appropriate (e.g.
when markets are distorted by speculative capital flows) and that
governments may need to intervene. (With growth, adjustments in
exchange rate would be easier, because the threat of large scale
bankruptcies would be reduced, and the consequences of any bankruptcy
would be lower, since there would be new job opportunities.)
Countries with surpluses would commit themselves to recycling those
surpluses to areas where the global social returns are high. For example,
they could fund green investments to help, say, developing and emerging
markets to retrofit themselves to address the challenge of global warming.
The international community would set up such funds, so that the risks
would be globally shared.
As countries with surpluses restructure their economies to reduce those
surpluses, they would recognize that restructuring cannot be based on
environmentally or economically unsustainable consumption: it must be
based on long-term investment and consumption patterns that are
sensitive to emission consequences.  
The global community would commit itself to closing the gap between
rich and poor countries, which entails provisions for “helping infant
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This would reduce the need to use exchange rate policy as an instrument
for promoting exports. The international community would similarly
commit itself to a developmentally oriented trade and intellectual
property regime.  This would entail the phasing out of agricultural
subsidies. In the meanwhile, a “concession”—of some value to the
developing country, of relatively little cost to the developed
countries—would allow developing countries to impose countervailing
duties against subsidized agricultural imports.  
By the same token, it makes little sense for advanced industrial countries
with aging populations to be running large trade deficits, but how they
correct those trade deficits matters. If they raise taxes on labor or savings to
reduce their fiscal deficits, that might reduce their trade deficit, but at the
expense of growth.  
On the other hand, a global carbon tax would help promote
sustainability, and lower taxes on workers could simultaneously promote
growth and equity, and increase aggregate demand.
A new global reserve system would help increase global aggregate
demand, and if appropriately designed, increase global equity.  
Such a growth compact (there are many more details that can be filled in)
can simultaneously promote growth, equity, and sustainability. All
countries would benefit, though some special interests (in each of the
countries) might suffer.  
This example illustrates the more general theme: it is a global agreement
where no country is lecturing another about what it should do. Some
previous lectures proved to be wrong, and there is a growing sentiment that
symmetry, besides being fairer, and more likely the basis of a global
agreement, would be more growth enhancing. In each country, some
special interests will be hurt, but the country as a whole benefits. No
country should take the stance that its special interests have priority over
the special interests in others. (Some countries take the stance that because
of their political processes, particular special interests have the ability to
block any agreement. According to this logic, political realism entails
simply accepting this “political constraint,” and working around it.)  
Conventional wisdom holds that making reforms is painful, but in the
long run, the benefits are worth the pain. A better way of putting it is that
there are certain groups within countries that will resist these changes, but
with many of the reforms described here, the country as a whole is actually
better off, even in the short run.  
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
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London School of Economics
The G20 Seoul Summit Document had at its heart: international macro
and financial reforms; IFI reform; fighting protectionism and promoting
trade and investment; and the Seoul Development Consensus for Shared
Growth/Multi-Year Action Plan (MAP) on Development. This combination
reflects strongly the vital transition from a G7/G8 club of rich countries to a
G20 group representing the major economies, populations and driving
forces of the world economy and politics. The Development Consensus/
MAP were real achievements, substantial steps forward and very welcome in
their priorities and specificities. Thus central to the challenge for the G20 in
2011 is implementation. There was much said in Seoul about ‘commitment’
and ‘accountability’, we will see how serious that was in 2011.
At the centre of the Development Consensus and MAP were
infrastructure, skills and banking/financial systems. All these are basic to
the investment climate which drives private investment, the engine of
growth, be it on the family farm or in the big firm. They are also basic to the
ability of people to participate in the economy and society so that growth is
shared within and across countries. The investment climate and the ability
to participate depend also, and crucially, on a range of policies and
institutions within the country, but infrastructure, skills and banking are
areas where those outside poor countries can play a particularly helpful role.
Above all the story of Seoul, and rightly so, was growth and the
participation in growth. It is these two together that have driven past
successes in overcoming poverty and will do so in the future, particularly in
low-income countries (LIC), or the poorest countries in the world. Their
progress will be linked inextricably with the conditions for investment, the
funding for investment, the investment in people, and the open-ness of the
international trading system. The G20 must maintain its emphasis on
these issues and follow the MAP.THE G20 AND RECOVERY AND BEYOND
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reduction and food security. On the contrary it is in large measure the most
important factor in achieving results on these two crucial objectives.
At the same time it must be clear that growth and the overcoming of
poverty are interwoven with the management of climate change. Low-
carbon technologies and the transition to low-carbon growth are at the
centre of the growth story around the world in the next few decades. Access
to power for so many of the 1.5 billion now without it, is likely to be
focussed on renewables. And it is the developing world which is hit earliest
and hardest by unmanaged climate change. Further, we must recognise (see
accompanying paper on climate change), that it will be impossible to bring
emissions down to the necessary 2 tonnes per capita (carbon-dioxide
equivalent) in 2050 for the then 9 billion people in the world, unless the 8
billion in the (currently) developing world in 2050 are below 2½ tonnes per
capita (and that would imply zero emissions in 2050 for the currently rich
countries). Overcoming poverty and managing climate change are
inextricably linked both in the consequences of inaction and in the
required elements for effective action. The emerging and poor countries of
the developing world will be laying down the infrastructure in the next two
decades which will determine whether we succeed or fail on these two
together. Thus as we boost infrastructure we should ensure that we also, as
a world, embrace the new energy-industrial revolution.
Infrastructure must be a special priority in the development process in
both the rural and urban sectors. Both sectors are essential in overcoming
poverty, but urban infrastructure will be a special challenge given the very
rapid pace of urbanisation. Infrastructure investment was understandably
top of the list in the Seoul Consensus/MAP priorities together with
investment in skills.
In this context the establishment and empowerment of the G20 High-
Level Panel for Infrastructure Investment is an urgent priority. It will be a
key vehicle for articulating priorities, providing and promoting analysis,
and creating momentum for country policy, the private sector and the IFIs.
The December deadline for appointing the chair seems already to have
been missed.
Of course, panels alone do not create investment, and country-level
policy for the investment climate will be key, but the Seoul Consensus,
with its strong emphasis on growth, does indicate a shift in international
development policy in a sensible direction. As the investment climate
improves, the challenge of funding investment will become ever stronger.
The financial system will be crucial because funding from the public
GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 41finances and the IFIs will fall far short of what is necessary. This means
looking at international financial sector reform in part through the prism
of whether it can yield the necessary financial flows to finance the large
required infrastructure and low-carbon investments. This should include
asking how flows of some parts of the large surplus in some countries of the
world, including China,  could usefully and profitably be used to finance a
significant part of this infrastructure investment in the poorest countries.
One final point on the reform of the international financial institutions,
the deepening and maturing of their commitment to development, and
their adjustment to the new G20 rather than G8 world: the headship of the
IMF and the World Bank. The G20 has indicated in earlier summits that the
old and unjustifiable deal or convention, under which the head of the IMF
goes to Europe and that of the World Bank to the USA, is no longer tenable.
Trust in the commitment of rich countries to development and the new
order would be gravely damaged if, as a result of an allegedly open
competition, the same IMF-Europe and World Bank–USA outcome were to
arise. The challenge might come in 2011. Europe and the USA must state
clearly not only that the competition will be open, but also, given the past
history, that there should be a special focus on qualified individuals from
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FISCAL POLICY FOR RECESSION
Kenneth J. ARROW
Stanford University
I make two suggestions for the agenda of the G20 meeting. The first is, I
am pretty sure, quite unattainable at the moment but should be an item in
the discussion. 
Fiscal Policy Recession
Despite all the political rhetoric in both Europe and the United States,
the simple idea that increased government spending can offset
unemployment seems to me hardly deniable.  Government spending may
have other adverse consequences: (1) it increases the public debt which
may or may not have long-run negative consequences, depending on
future developments, and (2) because of the lag between spending
decisions and actual spending, the spending may not come until it is no
longer necessary. Given the depth and probable length of the present
recession in Europe and the United States, the latter reason is probably not
operative. I note that Milton Friedman never denied the job-creating
effects of government spending; his objection to it was basically point (2),
that the government was a poor predictor (in his view, a poor economic
performer in any dimension).  
This is of relevance to the G20 through its international dimension. The
effect of an expansionary policy in any one country is diminished by
leakage. Hence, there is a value to coordination of fiscal policy to avoid,
“beggar-my-neighbor” effects. Macroeconomists have been preoccupied
with this subject for upwards of forty years, with little effect. Even the Euro
zone cannot achieve coordinated fiscal policy. I suppose this bastion of
sovereignty will not be breached soon, but it would be good to have the
question of internationally coordinated stimulative policy at least an item
in the agenda for discussion.  THE G20 AND RECOVERY AND BEYOND
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No doubt the argument about the causes of the recent financial collapse
will never be fully ended.  We still have widely divergent analyses of the
Great Depression, now eighty years in the past. One aspect is certainly the
question of information and belief. Who knows what?  Economic theory
for the last fifty years has been studying the concept of asymmetric
information. If there is one thing that is clear, it is that individual players in
the economic game have access to differing bodies of information. They
form beliefs on what they know and, presumably, on what they can infer
from the actions of others. (E.g., if securities prices are going up, though I
know nothing which would explain why, I might infer that someone else
has some favorable knowledge, and therefore revise my beliefs.) A further
point is that information is, after all, a commodity, in the sense that it has
value and it has cost, but it does not have the usual properties which make
it suitable for marketability: It can be transferred to someone else without
giving it up, it is not easily appropriable, and a given amount of
information can be used in any scale (for purchases of securities or for
production). On the other hand, much information is transferred by social
interactions without any necessary monetary counterpart.  
Putting all these considerations together, there is strong reason to make
as much financial information available to all as is practicable. Thus, if
financial institutions finance lending by short-term (frequently 24-hour)
borrowing, that fact should be revealed with high frequency so that all may
judge of the firm’s creditworthiness. It also implies that derivative
securities, such as credit default swaps, should be traded on well-organized
markets, with the usual guarantees for performance (as in futures or stock
markets) and prices that are publicly known. If these prices do convey
information about the probabilities of default of a security or a firm, this
information will be publicly known and can be acted on by both private
investors and government regulators. 
Whatever the full set of causes of the Great Recession are, it is clear that
the initial difficulties were greatly multiplied by the degree of leverage in
investment banks and hedge funds. A minimum step is to reveal to
everyone the amount of leverage, and this requires the increased scope of
compulsory reporting and of the use of publicly regulated organized
markets for risk-bearing.   




(The Focus of this Note is on the “Indicators” that the “Framework
Working Group” with input from the IMF and other institutions has to
propose to the G20, to help agreement on global “rebalancing”, as decided
at the Seoul meeting).
The G20 MAP (Mutual Assessment Process) is grounded in the justified
belief that cooperative economic policies can achieve a better outcome for
the world economy as a whole, as well as for the individual G20 countries,
than economic policies that are designed and implemented in isolation,
without regard for spillover effects and without taking into account the
interdependence between economies. 
The “cooperative scenario”, as described by the IMF, including in various
speeches by the Managing Director, involves demand expansion in the
surplus emerging market economies, notably China, and in some other
surplus countries such as Germany, compensating the growth dampening
effects of fiscal consolidation needed in many advanced economies. Fiscal
consolidation is believed to be required because of debt dynamics that
could provoke an increase in interest rates and negative expectations,
notably in the US. The inevitable short term negative effect on demand
would be compensated for by increased demand for exports coming form
surplus emerging market economies. Moreover, the needed fiscal
consolidation in advanced economies would be gradual and differentiated
according to fiscal space in different countries: Germany would reduce its
budget deficit by a much smaller amount than the UK or the US, for
example. The October IMF WEO contains some careful empirical analysis
on the effects of fiscal consolidation, showing that generally (excluding
extreme cases) consolidation has dampening short term effects on output,THE G20 AND RECOVERY AND BEYOND
THE G20 AND RECOVERY AND BEYOND48contrary to the argument that its confidence building effect might
dominate.1 This is not, of course, an argument against long term fiscal
reform and consolidation that can enhance growth, but a caution against
abrupt consolidation at a time of fragile recovery.   
Against the background of the cooperative scenario put forward by the
IMF, a great deal of attention in the process leading up to the Seoul
meeting, and during the Seoul meeting itself, has been devoted to the issue
of current account imbalances. While there was no agreement on specific
quantitative targets in the form of upper bounds on current account
deficits and surpluses, as had been proposed by the United States, there was
an agreement that large CA imbalances were likely to constitute a threat to
global economic stability and that, with the technical help of the IMF, the
G20 should try to develop a methodology to analyze the problem further
and develop a common approach that could help reduce unsustainable
imbalances. Other international institutions, notably the ILO, have been
invited to provide input into the MAP and the work of the “Framework
Group”, and thereby into the analysis of economic policies and their
interactions. The US had originally proposed that countries should commit
to bringing their CA deficits or surpluses below 4 percent of GDP. Instead,
the Seoul meeting ended with an agreement to have the G20 “Framework
Group”, with input from the IMF and others, produce a set of indicators
that would help in evaluating what was—and what was not—an
unsustainable or undesirable current account – and let that be a starting
point for discussing remedial policy actions. This work on current account
imbalances and on “indicators” that would help design a common
approach to the problem of how to reduce them, is consistent with the
“external re-balancing” requirement stressed by the IMF, as a key feature of
the “cooperative scenario” described above.
The follow-up and the content of this work on indicators will be of
critical importance to the success of the French Presidency. The G20 have
recognized the need for policy coordination. They have agreed to work
together towards macroeconomic policies that lead to positive rather than
negative spillover effects. They have asked the IMF to play a central
analytical and facilitating role in the process, which is entirely appropriate.
The door is open for other international institutions also, to bring their
expertise and experience to help the MAP. But there does not seem to be, as
yet, substantive progress or agreement on the set of indicators that should
1. See Chapter 3 of the October WEO by the IMF and the work by Alberto Alesina, and
Alesina and Silvia Ardagna referenced by the IMF. 
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utilized.
The G20 Indicators and wider policy issues
The macroeconomic work feeding into the G20 process has so far, and
understandably, been dominated by the central and traditional themes of
fiscal policy, monetary policy, and external payment imbalances. The
worrisome increases in public indebtedness in many advanced economies
as well as the crisis conditions that characterize some peripheral European
economies, further point to the need for careful analysis of fiscal policies. I
would like to argue, however, that the work on “indicators” called for by
the G20, creates a unique opportunity to broaden the policy debate and to
include in it more prominently discussion of policy issues relating to
employment and income distribution that tend to be neglected, but that
are of crucial importance both to the political economy of international
policy cooperation, and to the effectiveness of national macroeconomic
policies. This broadening must be mindful of avoiding a proliferation of
indicators that are not critical to the MAP. 
The problem of employment is certainly mentioned in the G20
Communiqué, but it is treated as part of the growth and recovery
challenge. There is little analysis of employment issues per se.2 Another key
set of concerns, the social safety net and income distribution, is hardly
mentioned at all. This is partly due to the understandable focus of the G20
on interdependence and spillover effects. Employment and income
distribution are considered as entirely domestic problems, as opposed to
current account imbalances, which are by their very essence international,
or fiscal and monetary policies, which have well recognized spillover
effects.
 In fact this separation of social policies from fiscal and monetary policies
is somewhat artificial. First, employment concerns are central to overall
macroeconomic strategy.3 The degree of expansiveness or restrictiveness of
both fiscal and monetary policies, in any country, has to be responsive to
the employment outlook. Consider the situation in the US, for example.
Looked at purely from the point of view of the need to reduce its current
account deficit, one can argue that the United States should tighten its
2. There are references to the work done by the OECD on labor markets. 
3. The centrality of employment to the formulation of macroeconomic policy choices was
recognized and discussed in September at a joint ILO-IMF conference in Oslo (see
www.osloconference2010.org). As of 2010 the ILO and the IMF have started to work
together on employment and social safety floor issues. 
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as, say, the path of the primary deficit. But considering that
unemployment remains stubbornly above 9.5 percent, with long term
unemployment in particular higher than in decades, fiscal tightening in
the near future is neither politically feasible nor in fact desirable. It has to
be acknowledged, therefore, that fiscal and monetary policies cannot just
target the external position, but will remain primarily targeted on domestic
conditions, very much including the employment outlook. If the US could
devise labor market policies that successfully increase employment, this
would in turn allow a fiscal and monetary policy mix more conducive to a
reduction of global imbalances. Suppose, for example and just to make the
point, that the US could have implemented “labor sharing” policies similar
to those of Germany, and had maintained, as Germany was able to do,
employment levels at close to pre-crisis levels, the fiscal and monetary
policy stance that would be feasible and desirable in 2011 in the US, would
be very different than it is now. Similar arguments, in a very different
national context, could be made for China. The threat of a slowdown in the
growth of employment- which despite rapid GDP growth has not been very
rapid -is much more worrisome to Chinese policy makers than a temporary
loss of two or three percentage points of GDP growth would be. If China is
to adopt policies, including exchange rate policies, that encourage a more
domestic demand and services (non-tradables) oriented growth pattern, it
will first want to reassure itself than no damage would be done to
employment creation. This is why employment and labor market analysis
must be a central component of the macroeconomic analysis supporting the
MAP, and not just appear as an add-on or as a separate effort “for Labor
Ministers only”.
Another important need for some “broadening” of the analysis
surrounding the MAP relates to income distribution and its impact on the
effectiveness of macroeconomic policies. A current account imbalance
necessarily reflects a difference between domestic production (income
generated) and absorption (income spent), translating into a difference
between domestic savings and investment. Exchange rate policy can only
affect the size of a current account surplus or deficit, if it directly or
indirectly leads to a change in the difference between savings and
investment. The way income is generated before taxes and distributed,
both before and after taxes, has an influence on savings and investment
behavior, and therefore on the current account. So quite apart from ethical
or purely political considerations, income distribution has macroeconomic
effects and should therefore, with labor market and employment issues, be
part of the issues analyzed  to support the MAP. Note in this context, that it
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but the combination of the public and private sector balances. 
The interaction between income distribution, the financial sector,
savings and investment, and fiscal policy are complex. It is often argued
that a more unequal income distribution is likely to lead to more savings, as
the rich save a larger proportion of their incomes. But fiscal incentives and
other factors may influence and counterbalance the effect of income
distribution. For example, if fiscal incentives and expectations regarding
effective demand do not encourage investment, income concentration at
the top may lead to lending from the very rich to the lower income groups
in a society, encouraging more consumption, intermediated by the
financial sector, a process formally modeled in a recent IMF working paper
by Kumhoff and Ranciere4. In the authors view, the causal chain of
increasing income concentration at the top, translating into the offer of
complex financial products to investors with many of these facilitating
excessive borrowing by the lower income household sector, rather than
more productive investment in tradables, was a central cause of the great
financial crisis in the US. Raghuram Rajan, in “Fault Lines”, puts forward
the same narrative in more informal language. Joseph Stiglitz and Robert
Reich, as well as others, have argued, in numerous publications, that US
income concentration should be a central concern of policy makers, not
just for ethical reasons, but in order to increase the effectiveness of
macroeconomic policies. Circumstances are of course very different in
China, but increasing income concentration as well as well as the weakness
of the social safety net, may have been a key reason explaining the very
high savings rate, and the strong reliance on export markets to fuel rapid
growth in the face of domestic household income and consumption
demand not growing as fast as production. In China, it is net exports rather
than borrowing by lower income groups that may have compensated for a
structural imbalance created by rising inequality.
 These income distribution related factors are sometimes included in the
macroeconomic work related to the MAP, under the heading of “structural
issues”. But they deserve a more central place in the analysis and should be
carefully considered when proposing packages of fiscal measures and
institutional reforms that could lead to global rebalancing and a better
outcome for the world economy. 
It should be feasible to come up with indicators that encourage a more
complete analysis of internal and external imbalances, without letting the
4. Kumhoff, Michael and Romain Ranciere “ Inequality, Leverage and Crises” ( 2010) 
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indicators should cover labor force participation and employment, and the
nature and composition of unemployment, in as simple a way as possible,
as well as key changes in the distribution of income that impact savings
and investment. These two or three “social” indicators would be additional
to the more traditional indicators restricted to aggregate fiscal balances,
debt levels and balance of payments trends. What is more challenging, but
very important, will be to integrate these indicators in an analytical
framework with behavioral hypotheses that allows the design of well
grounded policy recommendations that take into account the social and
political feasibility of various policy packages. 
Finally, the longer run growth implications of various public
expenditure packages should be kept in mind. The effect on debt dynamics
and the public sector’s balance sheet of public expenditures that build
human and physical capital and infrastructure are clearly different than
pure public consumption spending.
It is time to deepen and broaden the debate on macroeconomic and fiscal
policy, and integrate the analysis of structural issues with the analysis of
the traditional aggregates.  
A NEW CHALLENGE FOR EUROPE
Andrei BOUGROV
Interros Company
Experience is son of hard mistakes. These well-known words of the
Russian poet Alexander Pushkin reflect the current situation in Europe.
Europeans have just experienced not only a crisis but also a number of
attempts to fix it. It is time to reveal major challenges that EC faces.
The "policy trilemma" is the first of them. It is what lay behind the
breakdown of the last era of globalization. The real concern is that the crisis
bubbling on the other side of the Channel represents a make-or-break
moment for globalization. The rule of thumb here is as follows: of the three
aims we have been striving towards in recent history – democracy, national
sovereignty and global free trade – you cannot have any more than two at
any one time. Want to run your country as an independent state, open to
the whims and volatility of the free markets? The voters will punish you at
the ballot box. Insist that your nation has full control of its own affairs?
Then you have to jettison any plans to play a full part in the global
economy. Want democracy and globalization? Then you have to suborn
your sovereignty. 
The second challenge is the threat of crisis to European integration
itself. During our discussion we can point out issues related to the causes of
the current European financial crisis, its implications for European
integration, and possible policy responses.
One of the main lessons of the crisis: European integration must be sped
up, not slowed down. It is obvious that the crisis has been a setback, but the
benefits of integration are beyond doubt. Europe should build robust
integration measures in the face of financial crises. The economic policy
can be focused on the measures to reduce the severity or even prevent a
crisis. THE G20 AND RECOVERY AND BEYOND
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prevention, management, and resolution. The framework could include a
European Financial Authority, with the mandate and tools to deal cost-
effectively with failing systemic cross-border banks.
Europe should also strengthen economic policy coordination.
Currently, the major policy frameworks in Europe—macroeconomic,
financial, and structural—are relatively independent of one another. And
the next lesson of the crisis is that a single European currency without
enough economic policy coordination may lead to huge imbalances.
European countries must work together to sustain the economic
recovery. That is the priority. To restore confidence in Europe’s fiscal
sustainability, policymakers must formulate, communicate and begin to
implement strategies for exiting from crisis-related intervention policies as
soon as possible. 
The policy measures could include enhanced macroeconomic
surveillance, particularly on the fiscal impacts of asset cycles,
competitiveness, and balance of payment issues, as well as the creation of
an integrated supervising system. The challenge lay with the sufficiency of
both the domestic and international responses to deal with the next wave
of stress.
The third challenge is geopolitical one. The emergence of a US-Chinese
duopoly has reduced Europe to a more modest role in world affairs. For all
these reasons, Europe is suffering from uncertainty and gloom. The crisis
has also revealed serious weaknesses in the EU’s institutions. Governments
have not respected the stability pact. Deficits in several countries have spun
out of control. Although Europe has a single currency, member states have
not exercised the discipline necessary to defend it.
The European Commission remained mute when the storm peaked, but
eventually hit back by criticizing many EU member states for creating large
public deficits. The Commission now claims that 20 of the 27 EU’s member
states are too deeply in debt and should return as soon as possible to the
“reasonable” limits set out in the Growth and Stability Pact. But if
European member states follow the Commission’s recommendations
Europe can be brought to the brink of another crisis.
Europe is also interested in a new leadership related to sovereign defaults.
The Stiglitz report gives a detailed description of this pressing topic. One
more problem concerns debts of developing countries. The politicians and
experts are actively discussing the possibility of cancellation of all debts of
less developed countries. However we need to understand could such
decision promote the global economic growth.
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According to Rogoff and Reinhardt,”international banking crises are
almost invariably followed by sovereign debt crises”. Onno Ruding,
chirman of CEPS and former Netherlands finance minister, suggests that
the causal relationship may be inverted in a further development, as
sovereign debt crises in turn become international banking crises. That, of
course, is induced by the loss in capital values suffered by the sovereign
paper held by domestic and international banks. Thus a dangerous spiral
gets started, with cause and effect alternating at each turn between banks
and sovereign debt. 
The trouble is that the new Basel rules, known as Basel 3 , which have just
been agreed upon by represntatives of almost thirty countries, give banks
until 2016 to accumulate enough capital to reach the compulsory 7%
minimum limit. And this interval is supposed to give them a chance to
profit from massive doses of carry trade, transforming cheap short term
deposits in currencies like the Yen, the Euro, the Dollar, into holdings of
medium and long term sovereign paper, preferably issued by high risk
countries, that are, however, too big to fail or small enough to be rescued.
But those sorts of transactions are predicated on the realism of Walt
Wriston’s famous dictum that “sovereign countries do not fail”.
Thus the Basel Committee with one hand gives and with the other takes
away. The solution it suggests to revamp banks’ profits depends on a
condition that sovereign debt is mispriced because there is a pretense that
countries can fail, dictating a high interest rate, while countries really do
not fail. 
Thus far, most countries have never failed. (That, of course, covers the
decades after the second world  war. Before 1914, as can be checked inTHE G20 AND RECOVERY AND BEYOND
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international financial crises when capital that had been lent by the center
to the periphery went suddenly back to the center, sometimes because of
interest rates hikes in the center which may have been induced by reasons
mostly internal to the center). Nor had most countries, until recently,
allowed their own banks to fail. This tradition however was recently broken
by Iceland, which did indeed leave its banks to themselves. Moreover, in a
few months, several observers (including George Soros) have prognosticated
that a new coalition government, coming out of Ireland’s election in March,
could decide to repudiate its debt (which rose hugely as a result of the Irish
government’s ill considered 2008 decision to guarantee Irish banks’
liabilities). That would also be a first in a number of decades, and it could be
preceded by a decision of the same sort on the part of Hungary’s populist
government.  It is worth noting that Irish banks, as well as Greek banks,
have very large amounts of national debt among their assets. 
It is of the greatest interest, therefore, to see what governments and
international institutions have been recently adopting in the field of
financial regulation and supervision, in order to prevent exactly the
inception of a dangerous spiral as the one just evoked. 
It is by now obvious that, at least in the last fifteen years, but probably
since the financial liberalisation legislation introduced by Vice president
Bush in 1980, the invisible hand, as Ferguson and Johnson imaginatively
wrote in a recent article “waved good bye”. The failure of the so called
market solution in the financial sector at national and international levels,
is glaring and just as patent is that of so called self regulation, an expression
coined by the US SEC before the crisis. Re-regulation has therefore become
imperative, and in Basel, in Bruxelles and in Washington legislators and
administrators have been busy devising new rules for the financial system,
helped by the FSB and the Group of Twenty.
The so called Basel 3 Rules, as they have been recently published, have
made the capital requirements for banks much more stringent, severely
curtailing the number of assets which banks can consider as core tier one.
In particular, much less space has been given to so called Hybrids like
subordinated loans, as it has been discovererd that they often became
illiquid just when they were called. In fact, this problem of what may be
considered as liquid assets has beleaguered the financial world, especially
in Britain and the US, since the late nineteenth century. Short of full
bodied metal coins or ingot, or fully convertible legal tender cash, all assets
that have a credit nature have a degree of liquidity which is limited by the
probability that they be given back to the lender in full and at call and by
the depth width and resiliency of the market. 
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has been conveniently overlooked especially at times of financial euphoria,
with the result that banking systems have acquired the shape of great
inverted pyramids erected on very shaky foundations. 
The problem has become much more serious now that so little money is
constituted by cash, most of it being bank money and electronic money.
What XIXth century economists called the monetary system’s keel has
therefore become ever lighter and easy to get out of balance. We are
approaching what can be called fully wicksellian monetary systems.
Now, after the great disaster of 2007-08, an attempt is being made to
increase the ballast and give the system a more even keel. But will the
system’s private and public operators , at national and international level,
resist the temptation of having their cake and eating it, which is what
extending the definition of liquid assets traditionally means? The
resistance put up by the banks against the more exacting rules contained in
the early drafts of the US financial reform bill is evidence of the enmity of
banks and other financial institutions to serious regulation. That this is not
just an idiosyncratic  prerogative of US banks is shown by the cautious
approach in Basel and Bruxelles (and by the FSB), to maximum leverage
rules and by the fight, as Sheila Bair noted in a recent interview, over the
8% capital requirement, reduced to 7%.
Since the publication of Murdock Helmann and Stiglitz, ten years ago,
and the literature based on that seminal article, we also know that capital
requirements may be even counterproductive, as banking is not a business
like most others and capital requirements may push banks to go for riskier
assets, in order to maintain their profit rates. Profits per share, we must
remember, are the normal basis for stock exchange values and the Basel 3
rules rightly consider equity capital as the only core capital. More profits
per share normally means higher stock exchange valuations, hence greater
ease for banks to raise capital via the stock exchange. 
Here is another contradicition, therefore, between what the new rules
want to achieve (a stable and secure financial system) and the way they
suggest to achieve it.
A solution may be found in allowing, as Freixas and Parigi suggested in a
paper a few years ago, banks to own certain types of risky and remunerative
assets only if they are highly capitalised, while if they have less tier one core
capital, they may be barred from owning those assets. This is a variation on
the Volcker rule, one of the many possible ones.
A more drastic suggestion is that capital is not a substitute for hands-on
direct supervision, of the sort that was more frequently practiced in Europe
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reasoning similar to the one which sees banking as essentially different
from the type of insurance which tries to deal with strong uncertainty by
pooling insurers prepared to just bet, without giving much consideration
to parascientifically calculated odds.
But direct supervision, by inspecting the premises of banks and financial
insitutions and poring over their books, requires the sort of ethics of public
employment according to which money is not the only status conferring
vehicle. It has been noticed that this sort of public morality has been on the
vane in the last few decades, and that clever young people have only very
infrequently taken up public service careers after leaving college, much
preferring the high wages and high living offered by financial sector
employment.
In the last three years, as a result of the international crisis, parliaments
have been more sensitive to a swing of opinion in favour of greater
regulation. Hence the passing of laws like the recent financial reform bill by
the US Congress and the even more recent one introducing the European
Supervisory Authorities by the European Parliament. They both seem to be
less indulgent towards financial institutions than the rulebook called Basel
3. The latter, in fact, still puts rating agencies, whose record in the crisis has
been much below expectations, at the basis of most financial valuation
processes. And it maintains the internal risk assessment methods for large
banks, which was introduced by Basel 2 and made a very poor show of itself
in the crisis.
Neither the FSB nor the three ESAs, moreover, provide a well specified
and directly applicable procedure for the resolution of large and complex
financial institutions. 
Nor do they radically address systemic risk, which can be present, as we
painfully know, even in the case when liquidity requirements are satisfied
by all operators in the system.
There is a high chance that in coming months we shall see large
problems, which will most probably return on the international financial
scene,  being addressed rather than by rules, by ad hoc solutions painfully
arrived at in hastily convened international meetings of administrative and
political authorities. 
Meanwhile, some countries have resorted to purely national solutions to
address problems issuing from the very high amount mobility and
volatility of international short term capital, which, as in the 1920s and
1930s, tends to nullify their anti- inflationary monetary policies. Such is
the case, for instance, of South Korea, where a tax on international capital
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whose revenue will be destined to a fund to be used to address problems
that may affect the financial system in the future.
A variation of this tax could also be introduced, transforming it into a
financial transactions tax, to provide resources to a fund that might
repurchase national debt to keep it from falling to very low levels on the
open market. In this fashion, for instance, it might replace the
interventions to buy risky countries’ debt which are being conducted by
the ECB and are becoming too large and too frequent. 
Of course, this last mechanism would work much more effectively if it
were planned and executed at EU or even at OECD or IMF level. By allowing
a work out of large amounts of national debt, it might lift the pressure from
national budgets and in due course transform the Ruding vicious circle into
a virtuous one. 

STRUCTURAL UNCERTAINTY AND
THE CHALLENGES OF A DYSFUNCTIONAL
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM
A PARADOX OF RISK AVERSION
Robert JOHNSON
Roosevelt Institute
The Sovereign Wealth Funds are entrusted with managing the risk/
returns for their citizens in the current anxious environment. It is not
surprising that investors charged with this task during a time of structural
unraveling respond to the Knightian uncertainty and political discord by
seeking safety.5 Any given small investor by herself would be rational in
“seeking a port in a storm”, but when looking at the size of the
accumulated holdings of the emerging countries, one cannot help wonder
if we are on the brink of a collective “paradox of risk aversion” that is
analogous to Keynes’s paradox of thrift.
Financial theorists characteristically consider the distribution of risk and
reward as exogenous. When we pass from the realm of structural economic
analysis through the curtain and emerge into the domain of quantitative
finance theory, we rarely translate our structural parameters into the
higher moments of the statistical distributions. Yet, as we learned when
AIG underpriced credit default swaps in 2006-8, the collective behavior of
financiers does tend to morph the statistical distributions, meaning that
the distribution itself becomes endogenous. 6
It is in this spirit that I am asking whether, collectively, the safety seekers
managing the large funds of the surplus countries do not together present
5. See Ben Bernanke "Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Cyclical Investment," The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(1), pages 85-106, February. 1983
6. See the writings of Perry Mehrling on this question.  In particular his paper entitled, “The
Global Credit Crisis and Policy Response(2009) at http://www.econ.barnard.
columbia.edu/faculty/mehrling/Global_Credit_Crisis_and_Policy%20Response.pdfTHE G20 AND RECOVERY AND BEYOND
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our structural uncertainty, political discord, and the resulting riskiness of
our financial assets, whether stocks, bonds, currencies, or even sovereign
credit.  Do we experience a paradox of risk aversion by all trying to hold the
safest assets? Are we not collectively fighting in the tension between
financial sustainability and social/political sustainability that late Tommaso
Padoa Schioppa wrote about in his paper “The Ghost of Bancor”?7
One leader of an Asian fund described the challenge to me as rolling a
dime down a saddle. Ordinarily there is a large flat runway on the top of the
saddle with deflation and runaway inflation at remote distance from the
plateau. In the current context, the plateau narrows to a knife’s edge and
the difference between deflation and inflationary trajectories is very
narrow. Why are these seeming polar extremes both considered feasible in
the current context? I believe it is because we are in a rare period of
structural disequilibrium in the world economy not unlike the interwar
period when the leadership of the world economic system passed from the
United Kingdom to the United States. We are not in a period when
expectations can be easily and stably formed. This complicates the
challenge that protecting wealth entails.
Furthermore, in this instance, the very effort to preserve wealth by a
concentrated group of investors with large holdings may actually make
things more fragile and unstable. Not everyone can be safe in accumulating
wealth. To paraphrase Martin Wolf, the question is: how will surpluses of
accumulated wealth be destroyed? The degree of wealth destruction is not
known or predetermined ex ante. The sovereign wealth funds are not small
atomistic actors in the world system. While everyone can feel small in the
sea of international capital flows, I will conclude that the management of
large aggregations of sovereign wealth is tantamount to an oligopoly
problem with cooperative and non-cooperative outcomes that are
inherently unstable. (Cooperative outcomes invite cheating if one cannot
easily detect noncompliance). Yet the redirection of these large surplus
flows from the sanctuaries of sovereign debt into channels of expanding
risk and investment has the potential to play a key role in moving the
world economy from the trajectory of austerity and dysfunction to one of
greater growth and prosperity. The adverse feedback loop where fear
creates risk aversion, and risk aversion leads to an investment pattern that
is socially destabilizing, which in turn heightens risk aversion, can be
reversed. Sovereign investors, through their actions, could alleviate some
7. See The Ghost of Bancor at http://www.uclouvain.be/cps/ucl/doc/triffin/documents/TPS_
EN_finale_clean.pdf
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averse in investment behavior.
Radical Uncertainty: The Dark Knight 
of the Investment Soul
The concept of Knightian Uncertainty was developed in a period of
structural turmoil following the First World War (Frank Knight, Keynes in
his Treatise on Probability, and Hayek all saw the world through similar
lenses at that time). Similarly, we are now in a period when the “unknown
unknowns” loom large in our world economy. While I think these
concerns are relevant to nearly all of the developed economies in the
world, I will explore this particular challenge from the vantage point of the
United States, which has been at the center of the world system since the
1940s. The turmoil in that country is, I believe, the most threatening to
system coherence in the coming period.
Charles Kindleberger, the man who inspired me to become an
economist when I was an undergraduate at M.I.T., wrote on the Great
Depression and posited that the dysfunction of the world system at that
time was the result of the center of power no longer being able to provide
the “public good” of residual stability.8 In some respects, the United States
is now in a position similar to that of Great Britain in the Interwar period.
Meanwhile, China appears to be the advancing center. Note that the
transition from Britain to the USA was between two cultures that had deep
similarities in philosophy and tradition. A transition from U.S. to Chinese
leadership may not be endowed with these cultural understandings, and
this could make such an adjustment much more challenging. If one
models this challenge as a cooperative game with incomplete information,
it could be said that the ability to understand the reaction function of the
other player would be more difficult to discern and achieving cooperative
outcomes more difficult.
Zbigniew Brzezinski recently gave a speech at the Council on Foreign
Relations that highlighted two ominous themes.9 First, the structure of
power had changed from roughly a North Atlantic Alliance to the G20.
That the structure and distribution power was changed was not dangerous
8. See “The World in Depression, 1929-39”, by Charles P. Kindleberger, University of
California Press.  The culminating argument of the book is online at http://www.
mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/depress.htm
9. See Zbigniew Brzezinski’s talk at the Council on Foreign Relations May 18, 2010 online
at: http://dailybail.com/home/nwo-exposed-in-cfr-speech-brzezinski-warns-political-
awakeni.html
THE G20 AND RECOVERY AND BEYOND66in and of itself, but the fact that there was not a design for an orderly
system upon which all elites could agree, was very dangerous.
Second, Brzezinski expressed the view that the spillovers from the
excesses of the financial sector culminating in the Crisis of 2008 had caused
great losses for many across the planet. The ugly nature of the way public
balance sheets were used to keep the financial system from collapsing, while
necessary, appears to have ignited the rage of the body politic in many parts
of the world, perhaps most importantly in the United States, which is has
been the lynchpin of the world economy in the previous epoch.
One need not argue whether the bailouts were necessary. I believe they
were. But as they say, there are ways, and there are ways—and the most
recent episode was a way that inflamed the public. We have been through
an episode in which we made the abused body politic pay the perpetrators,
rather than proceed as we did during the S&L bailout, where wiping out or
dilution of stock, changing management, criminal prosecutions, and
restructuring of creditors dominated the resolution process. That the
United States government, through TARP and thereafter, seemed very able
to mobilize large-scale funds on very short notice and rescue the financial
system was a good thing. That it seems only able to do this in response to,
and on behalf of, a powerful financial elite has set in motion some very
sour psychology that is likely to heighten our sense of Knightian
Uncertainty for a long time to come. As Amartya Sen illustrated in a
convening of economic historians I attended at Harvard in the spring of
2010, to do the bailouts was a cooperative game in the sense that we lost
less than was possible. Yet the distribution of the burden of moving us to
the cooperative outcome sowed the seeds of distrust for the repeated games
of governance that would follow. The financial leaders made a very strong
and accurate case that they must be rescued because they could take the
economy down with them. But this notion now stands in stark
contradiction to the complacency that Wall Street leaders demonstrate
with regard to persistent joblessness in America and the resistance that
they exhibit to financial regulation proposals that would restrain their
capacity to spillover onto the real economy in the ways they acknowledged
during the depths of the crisis. It appears to the public that Washington is
very responsive to Wall Street and that we are “all in this together” only
when the financial sector is in extreme jeopardy. 10
10. This bold revelation of where power lies in U.S. society is reminiscent of the forebodings
of Herman Melville who warned of the discouragement of society when it was revealed
starkly that society did not operate according to the democratic premise that “all men are
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recent polling on the impact of U.S. government policies done by the Pew
Foundation in July of this year.    
Two tables make the point:
Government policies seen as doing little for the poor, 
middle class, small business
Source : Pew Research Center/National Journal July 15-18, 2010.
Who’s been helped by economic policies?
Percent who say each has been helped a great deal/fait amount by the federal government’s 
economic policies since 2008
Source : Pew Research Center/National Journal July 15-18, 2010.
created equal”. Melville’s poem “Clarel”, written late in his life, explored these tensions.
William Sloane Coffin, the American theologian, also referred to Melville when he wrote:
But today, because we have so cruelly separated freedom from virtue, because we define
freedom in a morally inferior way, our country is stalled in what Herman Melville call the
"Dark Ages of Democracy," a time when, as he predicted, the New Jerusalem would turn into
Babylon, and Americans would feel "the arrest of hope's advance."
Gov’t econ policies 
have helped…. Great deal (%) Fair amount (%)
Not too much/at 




53 21 18 8=100
Large corporations 44 26 20 10=100
Wealthy people 31 26 30 12=100
Poor people 7 24 64 5=100
Middle class people 2 25 68 4=100
Small businesses 2 21 68 8=100
Total (%) Rep (%) Dem (%) Ind (%) D-R diff
Wealthy people 57 45 67 58 +22
Middle class people 27 16 37 28 +21
Small business 23 14 35 21 +21
Large corporations 70 61 74 74 +13
Poor people 31 33 33 29 0
Large banks and 
financial institutions 74 75 73 77 -2
THE G20 AND RECOVERY AND BEYOND68After the creditors of heavily leveraged financial institutions were bailed
out and the public balance sheet was expanded to stem the financial crisis,
we are now entering a period when many people are rebelling against
further use of the public balance sheet to support anything, including the
real economy via infrastructure repair or other forms of stimulative deficit
spending. In a sense, the rise of the debt/GDP ratio in the U.S. and other
developed countries, coupled with the particularly difficult digestion of the
distributional nature of the bailouts, has damaged the public’s trust in the
capacity of government to manage the economy. It has reinforced in the
mind of the citizens Ronald Reagan’s claim that government is the
problem, not the solution. At a time when persistent unemployment is
near 10 percent in official numbers, and those not working are a far greater
percentage of the workforce, it would seem an obvious time to rebuild
infrastructure and to emerge from the slump. Following the lessons of the
Great Depression and the example of the New Deal, one would think we
would have a broad social consensus for such action. Yet such an
assumption does not take into account the deterioration of trust we have
experienced or the success of persuasive forces in denigrating the capacities
of government.11
Harold James, the historian at Princeton University, has written in his
most recent book of how the deterioration of trust following a financial
crisis renders government-centered efforts impotent.12 Not only is
economic value destroyed in the acute downturn of the economy, but the
capacity to function as a society experiencing market dysfunction is
devastated too. Human values are destroyed along with economic value.
James likens the crisis of 2008 to the banking crisis in Germany in 1931,
and in his previous work on the German Slump he studies how
parliamentary and interest group struggles lead to extreme government
paralysis and dysfunction. 13
11. The notion of persuasive forces that may or may not be creating perceptions that
corresponded to “Truth” is explored in great detail by George Soros in his Budapest
Lectures and in his essay, “What I Did Not Know: Open Society Reconsidered”, in What
Orwell Didn’t Know: Propaganda and the New Face of American Politics, Public Affairs
Books, edited by Andras Szanto. Soros differentiates between the cognitive function,
where learning the truth allows an individual to better understand and operate in the
environment, and the manipulative function, where the strategy of altering the
perceptions of other people so that they advocate actions that make the manipulator
better off.   
12. See “The Creation and Destruction of Value: The Globalization Cycle” by Harold James,
Harvard University Press (2009).  See particularly his chapter comparing 2008 to 1931
rather than 1929.  Also see the concluding chapter.  
13. See The German Slump: Politics and Economics 1924-1936.  Oxford University Press
1986.  See also Walter Dean Burnham’s excellent paper on Weimar politics entitled,
“Political Immunization and Political Confessionalism: The United States and Weimar
Germany, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Summer, 1972), pp. 1-30
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be civil, not just financial. Asset management consultant Robert Dugger, in
testimony to the National Commission on Budget Responsibility and
Reform, expressed the view that budgets are only in part about money.14
They express the fabric of civil commitments that citizens have made to
each other over many decades. Those commitments—public safety,
education, good roads, freedom from government over-regulation, and
reasonable taxes—are built into local, state and federal budgets. People
organized their families and businesses around these commitments. The
very slowness with which they accumulated and were reaffirmed year after
year in budget legislation attested to their firmness and reassured people
they could safely organize our lives around them.
For Dugger, a budget crisis is a crisis not because there is not enough
money. It is a crisis because the fabric of our society is being ripped apart,
threatening families and businesses. To restore trust and assure voters that
the fabric of society will be preserved, a commitment, must be found—a
commitment so compelling that if voters can be assured this commitment
will be met, they will be agreeable to adjusting the others and to
constructing a new fabric of civil relationships peacefully and
cooperatively.
The economic and budgetary dysfunction we are seeing in the United
States is in some ways similar to James’ scenario. The impending loss of
trust in government, and the anti-incumbent nature of the current popular
sentiment, will to put the Obama Administration into a much weaker
position following the November election. However, it must be said that
this is not a simple Democrats vs. Republican issue. Within the Democratic
Party, this debate is raging all by itself.
Many economists are currently engaged in the fight over the magnitude
of the Keynesian multiplier and other rituals about the efficacy of fiscal
policy. The body of evidence, I believe, suggests that it is at times like these,
with lots of slack in the economy, that the impact can be quite significant.
Yet that is not the fight that I believe is really taking place. The “small
multiplier” economists are just the current intellectual advance troops of
the major fight in the United States about the size and role of government.
Whether government stimulus works or not, and whether or not
infrastructure augments productivity and private investment is crowded in
or out, is of little matter to those who, as a matter of philosophy, do not
14. See, Robert Dugger’s “Testimony to the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and
Reform”. June 30, 2010. http://www.hanoverinvest.com/pdf/TestimonyFiscal Responsibility
Commission100630.pdf
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to endure the seemingly unnecessary short-term pain of a slump to purge
American society of the dreaded government.
This is a major conflict, and with the Republicans having gained ground
in November, we are likely to see this fierce battle continue. The stalemate
will, in the sense of Kindleberger, likely render the center reserve currency
country of the international monetary system more unstable because the
essential degree of freedom and fiscal policy that must now be used to
maintain aggregate demand in light of interest rates being at the zero lower
bound will be unavailable as the “conflict of visions” in the United States
plays out. In the following section I will argue that this stalemate is what
will make the international monetary system very unstable and uncertain.
A look over to Europe and its similarly vigorous efforts at fiscal
consolidation implies that the alternative to the dollar, the euro, is unlikely
to be able to help balance the system, either.
The International Monetary System Dysfunction
The world economic structure has been based on a regime of export-led
growth to the United States since WWII.  The American market has been
the buyer of last resort. The rise in private indebtedness of U.S. households
on the back of the housing boom and decline of the U.S. savings rate gave
that structure a burst of energy that came to a halt with the crisis of 2008.
More ominous is the reality that expanding consumer spending was
accompanied by declining real incomes for many Americans as any given
dollar of income was supported by more and more credit.
At the same time, our open free trade system has favored outsourcing and
offshoring of key elements of the production process that tended to put
pressure on wage and compensation growth. This pressure on American
consumers surged at the time of NAFTA and accelerated with the
development of China and India in recent years. This contradicts the long-
term notion of U.S. consumers being able to sustain their role as the buyer of
last resort. Compressions of incomes for large portions of the U.S.
population that resulted from competition with low wage regions of the
world was incompatible with the maintaining the vitality of U.S
consumption and export-led growth for everyone else. For a time, the credit
innovations delayed a reckoning, but that systemic contradiction is now
exploding into full bloom with the collapse of the consumer credit pump.
This shock to the pattern and magnitude of global aggregate demand is, to
my mind, the fundamental deflationary impulse that the world is now ill-
equipped to address. We were dependent on this structure of trade for a very
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cyclical situation. It will take many years to rebalance the system, and that
altered trajectory is now very stressfully beginning to work itself out.
Some economic commentators have seen on the distant horizon that a
rebalancing of demand in the emerging markets involving less export led
growth and more domestic development and spending is the path to
harmonization of the world system.  Unfortunately, the components of
aggregate demand are not quite so protean in any significant shorter time
frame. Regimes that are predicated on export-led growth involve a system
of tax, subsidy, regulation and other structural priorities that are not easily
shifted.  It often requires a drastic realignment of domestic politics to shift
from export-led growth to domestic-driven growth or vice versa. Powerful
groups within the domestic political economy are put into conflict with
each other. The timing of the resolution, no less than the shape of the
outcome itself, is not at all clear.15
That is the dimension of uncertainty that the international monetary
system is coping with as we look toward the future. One could see that the
scale of imbalances, as measured by the degree of reserve accumulation in
the surplus countries, has been soaring. With the U.S. dollar having many
features that have given it the dominant structural role as the reserve
currency, most importantly the broad, deep and transparent government
bond market with the availability of the full spectrum of maturities, much
of the reserve accumulation was recycled to the U.S. dollar and the U.S.
Treasury market in particular.
For several years, particularly since the end of the Asian crisis in the late
1990s, rising surpluses (U.S. deficits) and the recycling of surpluses back
into dollar denominated securities served to raise the foreign exchange
value of the dollar, and added a deflationary impulse to aggregate demand
in the United States. The Federal Reserve was able to offset this by lowering
interest rates to manage its mandate of full employment and price
stability.16 In analytical terms there is an iso-demand curve in exchange
rate/interest rate space that led to a combination of stronger dollar and
lower interest rates to keep the U.S. macroeconomic system in a distorted
form of balance. Large private imbalances with a dearth of savings, rising
government deficits, and large current account deficits have been the
American pattern.
15. See Mancur Olson’s book, “The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth,
Stagflation, and Social Rigidities”, Yale University Press: 1984.  
16. See Martin Wolf’s book, “Fixing Global Finance”, Johns Hopkins Press: 2010 for the
elaboration of this argument. 
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question now with interest rates at the zero. The collapse of the
securitization and consumer finance markets in the USA has damaged the
U.S. buyer of last resort system of world commerce and has set in motion a
musical chairs game in the international monetary system of passing the
deflationary hot potato around. Deficient demand worldwide is being
redistributed. The mercantilist tendency around the world of exporting
deflation through exchange rate management often then cycles back to the
U.S. economy, but the Federal Reserve is unable to offset this now at the
zero lower bound of interest rates. As the European tensions over Greece
and the other peripheral countries came to the fore earlier this year and
showed how inferior the credit market structure of Europe is to the
sovereign debt market of the United States (and Japan), the upward
pressure on the dollar was compounded for a time and could not be offset
with lower interest rates.
The deflationary shock to U.S. aggregate demand, emanating from
beggar-thy-neighbor exchange rate policies and the self-insurance
behavior of surplus countries that leads to reserve building could
theoretically be offset by the instrument of macroeconomic policy-fiscal
expansion. A larger public works infrastructure project for the American
economy could accomplish this if the political consensus were to exist, and
that program could permit the U.S. to absorb some deflationary shock and
could buy time for the transformation of the world economy. Fiscal policy
could be the residual balancing element that monetary policy has been in
response to the accumulation of dollar reserves by foreign governments.
Yet in the current gridlock and conflict over the role of government in the
United States, that component of aggregate demand cannot be as
responsive as the Fed-interest rate mechanism has been until we hit the
zero lower bound.
I note here that the scenarios of quantitative easing by the United States
that are widely covered in speeches and the media are a different type of
adjustment mechanism and a U.S.-only QE initiative may be tantamount
to exporting deflation back out from the United States into the rest of the
world.
At a deeper level, this international monetary dysfunction and the
management of nominal exchange rates by many of the mercantilist
minded export-led growth economies may be tantamount to letting real
variables adjust via inflation differentials rather than nominal exchange
rates. Efforts to resist exchange rate appreciation may lead to rising asset
price inflation and eventually goods price inflation in some of the surplus
nations. Suffice it to say that in the present situation, China, Japan,
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growth surplus nations when the U.S. grinds down to moderate deflation as
a result of the retrenchment of the household balance sheet as the paradox
of thrift tightens its grip on the frightened American citizen.  Inflation in
the emerging markets and deflation in the developed world are the results
of this dysfunctional exchange rate pegging and reserve accumulation
system that strives to protect the export strength in the emerging world
that continues to accumulate a “self insurance” war chest of reserves to
protect the emerging nations from the violence of the international capital
markets. Both sides of the saddle I mentioned in the introduction are
before our eyes simultaneously: deflation in the developed world and
bubble-building inflationary forces in the emerging countries that defend
their export sector. In addition, the tendency of the large developed
countries to accumulate private and sovereign debt to ward off deflation
may at some point lead to a drive for inflation to lighten that burden. It is
unlikely that this system of imbalances will alleviate the uncertainty that
breeds caution.  It is also likely that fear and caution will lead to investment
behavior that exacerbates structural uncertainty. We likely require both
political and financial leadership that is currently in short supply before we
can move to a systemic logic that transitions from the Dark Knightian
anxiety of uncertainty and sheds light on a path that coheres.
Sovereign Wealth Funds: A Collective Paradox 
of Risk Aversion?
Can an international monetary system withstand such large flow
imbalances as we have seen in the last 10 years on an ongoing basis?  And
can the system cope with a recycling of imbalances of these magnitudes
into the riskless asset? Writers such as Charles Dumas of Lombard Street
Research, in his new book entitled “Globalization Fractures”, suggest that
the key to adjustment in the face of the deficient aggregate demand caused
by the exhaustion and retrenchment of the American consumer must take
two dimensions. First is the reduction of the scale of those imbalances.
Second is a cessation of the degree of risk aversion on the part of those
investing what imbalances do remain to be recycled. 17
To alleviate what Ricardo Caballero refers to as the excess demand for
safe assets, several responses can be pursued.18 First, the sovereign wealth
17. See “Globalization Fractures: How Major Nations’ Interests are Now in Conflict”, by
Charles Dumas.  Profile Books: 2010. 
18. See “The “Other” Imbalance and the Financial Crisis”, by Ricardo Caballero. M.I.T.
Working Paper 9/32 2009.  Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1529764
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equity or even direct investments in greater proportions. Obviously, given
the sheer size of their investment capacity, it would entail some loss of
liquidity. It would also involve what might be a good long-term investment
in human capital in assessing more complex or information-intensive asset
classes from within their institutions.
Second, the United States government could intermediate and buy
riskier assets or make direct investments with the proceeds of its bond sales
to the surplus countries. This would be somewhat difficult to achieve,
given the American aversion to belief in the ability of the government to
allocate capital efficiently. Though an infrastructure bank could be
developed with private sector board and experienced financiers to provide
the needed risk transformation services, it would likely face steep
opposition from those who are enraged by the coexistence of the GSEs
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae with the housing related crisis. Setting up new
government institutions to intermediate credit is likely to be a difficult task
when the losses on the balance sheet of Freddie and Fannie become more
and more evident to the public in the coming months. 19
Third, a public guarantee could be issued to support private risk
transformation services on a large scale. This pathway is likely to be
complicated by public aversion to giving any more support to the well-paid
executives of financial institutions who were paid with taxpayer funds to
clean up the mess that they made. Beyond the politics, there is also the
question of whether investors would support these institutions that have
lost a great deal of the world’s confidence in an aggressive program to
provide risk transformation services.20
19. On the role of Freddie and Fannie in the crisis. see Thomas Ferguson and Robert Johnson,
“Too Big to Bail: The 'Paulson Put,' Presidential Politics, and the Global Financial
Meltdown" in the International Journal of Political Economy, Spring, Part I, and Summer
Part II,  2009.   
20. On U.S balance of payments and transformation services see Caballero op cit. and also
“From World Banker to World Venture Capitalist: The US External Adjustment and the
Exorbitant Privilege”, by Helene Rey and P.O. Gourinchas, in 'G7 Current Account
Imbalances: Sustainability and Adjustment', Richard Clarida, Editor, The University of
Chicago Press, 2007.
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Can We Break Out of the Paradox of Risk Aversion?
I do believe that we are on an unsustainable path and that the United
States will not, despite the logic of possibility, be able to provide the
balancing role for the international monetary system in the coming period.
Perhaps the best we can hope for is a system where America does not suffer
the deflationary consequences of the mercantilist competition of the
surplus countries and uses monetary policy to re-export deflation. But as I
watch the debates favoring austerity in the U.S. and Europe, and I imagine
central banks in the developed world pumping more liquidity into the
system in response to U.S. quantitative easing, I can only envision this
effort collectively as one that builds an even bigger bubble in asset and
commodity markets to try and induce a wealth effect that stimulates
consumption. That process seems well underway and it has reduced the
cost of debt services while encouraging an ever-greater mountain of debt
when business, household, and government debts are added together.
It seems to me that what is needed in the developed countries is not
bubbles or austerity but a policy constellation directly targeted on
investment spending, human capital investment, a modernization of the
supply side, and a focus on productivity growth to inspire confidence the
sovereign debt to GDP ratios can be managed. It is on that trajectory, rather
than on one of austerity, that we can restore confidence. The question is:
who will make the first move in that direction if the United States
government cannot because of its peculiar struggles? Perhaps this time the
bold endeavors will emanate from a new leadership coalition that uses the
growing sophistication at the sovereign wealth funds as the vanguard of
constructive change.21, 22
21. See Felix Rohatyn’s Bold Endeavors for a number of examples of system changing large-
scale productivity enhancing government investment programs.
22. For more on the U.S. budget challenge see the White Papers from the Roosevelt Institute
by Joseph Stiglitz, and Thomas Ferguson and Robert Johnson at: http://
www.rooseveltinstitute.org/Dec_2_Discussion#Synopsis





An important lesson of the global crisis is that a liberalised financial
sector is vulnerable to systemic financial crisis which has the potential to
inflict enormous cost on the real economy, in terms of lost output and
employment and fiscal costs. Although most developing countries were
able to avoid serious contagion from the recent global financial crisis, they
have suffered from systemic financial crises in the recent past, notably in
Latin America and East Asia in the second half of the 1990s. Global efforts
to strengthen financial regulation are, therefore, relevant for developing
countries. Also of relevance is the need to re-evaluate financial sector
strategies more generally and, in particular, to determine the appropriate
balance between financial liberalisation and government regulation,
whether for prudential or economic motives.
The G20 asked the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) to
formulate proposals for reform of global standards for the regulation of
banks. The BCBS submitted its proposals in October and these were agreed
by the G20 in November 2010. The reforms, dubbed “Basel III”, include
higher minimum equity and tier 1 capital requirements for banks, the
introduction of a capital conservation buffer, stricter definitions of equity
capital, the introduction of a non risk weighted leverage ratio, two new
liquidity requirements and a countercyclical capital buffer which can be
imposed at the discretion of national regulators to restrain excessive credit
growth. They will be phased in over the period 2013-19. The reforms are
very narrow in scope, and do not tackle some key regulatory issues, notably
the question of the appropriate boundaries in terms of permissible business
activities of banks which take deposits and enjoy the umbrella of
government deposit protection schemes.THE G20 AND RECOVERY AND BEYOND
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regulation in developed economies. Although developing countries are
represented on the BCBS, representation is mainly confined to the larger
emerging markets and the only African representation is that of South
Africa. Consequently, global standards for bank regulation do not fully
reflect the needs of developing countries. This is also evident in the Basel III
reforms, which do not adequately address the regulatory challenges facing
developing countries, in several key respects.
Raising the minimum capital requirements is unlikely to be sufficient to
ensure that banks in developing countries can absorb the losses from major
adverse shocks to their balance sheets and remain solvent. This is because
the volatility of the value of their assets is much greater than that of their
counterparts in developed economies, and hence their potential losses are
much larger. As such capital requirements in developing countries need to
be complemented with regulations to curb the riskiness of banks’ asset
portfolios, such as restrictions on loan concentration. This must be backed
up by more effective supervision, including on-site bank inspections, to
verify that banks comply with prudential regulations. Bank regulators
should adopt a more intrusive approach to supervision, intensifying on-
site bank examinations and placing less trust in banks’ internal risk
management systems and controls. 
Financial crises in developing countries have often been associated with
balance of payments (BOP) crises. The growing integration of the financial
systems of developing countries into global financial markets has
heightened their vulnerability to systemic risks. The very low interest rates
currently prevailing in developed countries provide a strong incentive for
capital to flow into developing countries in search of higher yields. Short
term capital flows to developing countries are often very volatile and sharp
reversals of capital inflows (“sudden stops”) can generate both BOP crises
and liquidity crises in the domestic banking system. In addition, a sharp
depreciation of the real exchange rate can bankrupt domestic borrowers
whose liabilities are denominated in foreign currency and hence generate
losses for domestic banks which have extended credit to them. 
The reforms to global bank regulation do not address the risks to
financial stability arising from volatile external capital flows intermediated
through the domestic financial system, but policymakers in developing
countries cannot prudently ignore these risks. Designing effective micro-
prudential and macro-prudential policy measures to protect the domestic
financial sector and the economy from the adverse consequences of
volatile capital flows should be a priority.
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controls or taxes on short term capital inflows. The unwinding of the large
macroeconomic imbalances which characterise the global economy in the
years ahead is likely to exacerbate volatility in exchange rates across the
globe. The exchange rate will be a channel through which global instability
will be transmitted to the domestic economies of developing countries. It is
well known that policymakers cannot target both domestic variables and
the exchange rate simultaneously if the capital account is fully open.
Consequently stabilisation of the domestic economy in developing
countries, in the face of instability transmitted from the rest of the world
through international capital flows, may only be possible if there are
controls of some sort on capital flows, especially short term portfolio flows.
The last 20 years has witnessed a general trend towards the liberalisation
of restrictions on what banks are allowed to do. Regulations have been
liberalised in many countries to allow banks to engage in a range of “non
bank” financial activities, such as investment banking and insurance,
motivated by a belief that market forces should dictate what types of
financial services banks should provide. The global financial crisis exposed
the shortcomings of this belief. Some of the major bank failures in
developed economies were the result of risks incurred in activities outside
of traditional commercial banking, such as investment in complex
securities. Moreover, the benefits in terms of economic welfare of the
exponential growth of trading activities by banks is not self evident. 
For policymakers in developing countries two issues related to the
permissible activities of banks are critical. First, should bank regulation
restrict banks from specific types of non bank financial business because
the risks of these activities, which might be difficult to understand,
monitor and quantify, could undermine financial stability? Secondly, are
there specific financial services which are important for economic
development – for example lending to private investors in emerging sectors
of the economy – which cannot be supplied on a purely commercial basis
in a market oriented financial sector because of market imperfections of
some sort (which may lie outside the financial sector)? If so, there may be
grounds for governments to intervene to ensure that these financial
services are supplied in the optimal manner, although there are clearly
practical difficulties with such intervention. 
As noted above, the post-crisis global economic environment threatens
to be much more volatile than the period which preceded the global
economic crisis. Accordingly, developing countries are likely to be buffeted
by major external shocks, which will affect their balance of payments and,
through the BOP, their financial systems and their domestic economies. In
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valuable role in helping developing countries adjust to the shocks. Both the
IMF and the African Development Bank responded to the global economic
crisis by setting up new lending facilities for countries facing temporary
BOP difficulties. The IMF established the Exogenous Shocks Facility and the
AfDB established the Emergency Liquidity Facility. Such facilities will also
be important to help developing countries bridge temporary funding gaps
which arise when access to commercial finance (such as trade finance) is
disrupted, as happened during the global financial crisis. However, the
usefulness of these facilities is dependent upon their being made available
to developing countries quickly and with the minimum of conditions
when the need arises. 
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The recent global financial crisis showed how dysfunctional the current
international monetary and financial architecture is for managing today’s
global economy. The calls for and steps taken to reform such architecture
are, therefore, welcome. Similar calls for reform were made after the
sequence of Asian, Russian and Latin American crises of the late
20th century, but they led at best to marginal reforms. The fact that this
time industrial countries have been at the center of the storm has led to
firmer action.
The financial meltdown unleashed by the crisis in the market for
subprime mortgage-backed securities in the U.S. and, particularly, by the
collapse of Lehman Brothers in September, 2007, made clear that there was
significant deficit in regulation and supervision of financial activities.
Since the Asian crisis, it had become an established principle that financial
liberalization must be accompanied by stronger prudential regulation and
supervision. This principle was applied in many parts of the developing
world, but it was entirely disregarded in the United States, where further
liberalization was accompanied by deregulation and weak supervision of
financial intermediation. European banking also suffered major problems
associated with investments in high risk assets issued in the US, real estate
euphoria in a number of countries, and the lending booms in several
Central and Eastern European countries, among other factors.
While the massive expansionary monetary policies and interventions to
rescue bankrupt financial institutions in the industrial economies
contained the hemorrhage, they have only had partial effects in generatingTHE G20 AND RECOVERY AND BEYOND
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the leadership of the G20 have been positive but only partial in scope,
particularly in relation to the adoption of clear rules that help manage the
strong procyclicality of finance. Significant effort in reforming IMF credit
lines, increasing the resources available to this institution and making the
largest issue of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) in history have also been
important achievements.
However, and crucially, monetary expansion in industrial economies
and, particularly, in the U.S. have had major international spillovers,
which ignited the so-called “currency wars”, making it clear that the global
monetary system also need deep reforms. This is an area where reforms
have been insignificant so-far. Since 2009, there had been calls by the
Chinese Central Bank governor and the UN Commission of Experts on
Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System headed by
Joseph E. Stiglitz, among others, for deep reforms of the global reserve
system. The currency wars now indicate that the world exchange rate
system –or, rather “non-system”, as it involves a mixed of all possible
exchange rate regimes that has shown limited capacity to correct global
imbalances— may also need an overhaul. And in the face of the flood of
capital that they have received since mid-2009, many emerging and
developing countries are responding by strengthening or re-imposing
capital account regulations. These interventions may also have partial
effects and also generate international spillovers of their own, indicating
that cross-border finance may also require regulations of its own, in fact as
part as the global effort to re-regulate finance.
The four elements of global monetary reform –the global reserves and
exchange rate systems, capital account regulations and emergency balance
of payments financing— are closely interlinked. This is reflected, first of all,
in the fact that countries can adjust to variations in net capital inflows
through a mix of four mechanisms: letting their exchange rates move (the
second mechanism), absorbing such flows through changes in foreign
exchange reserves (the first), controlling inflows or outflows (the third) and
getting IMF financing (the fourth). The linkages between the four elements
were also reflected in the way the post-war monetary system was designed
at Bretton Woods, which included a dual gold-dollar standard, together
with the principle that exchange rates would be fixed but could be adjusted
in the face of fundamental balance of payments disequilibria, the capacity
of countries to resort at any time to regulating capital flows, and limited
IMF balance of payments financing.
The collapse of the first of these components of the global monetary
architecture in the early 1970s gave way to a system in which inconvertible
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currencies fluctuate against each other. More generally, however, IMF
members are allowed to adopt any exchange rate regime so long as they
“avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary system
in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an
unfair competitive advantage over other members”, as Article IV of the IMF
Agreement reads. The U.S. and the then Managing Director of the IMF tried
to add a third leg to the system during the IMF Meetings in Hong Kong in
1997: the principle that capital accounts should be liberalized. They failed,
but market pressure and mainstream economic thinking have imposed this
principle in practice. So, we now have a global monetary system essentially
based on: (i) a fiduciary dollar standard (and secondarily, on competition
of different currencies to play the role of reserve currencies); (ii) the
freedom of countries to choose whatever exchange rate system they prefer
with flexible exchange rates being the dominant mechanism among major
currencies; (iii) largely free capital movements; and (iv) IMF financing that
has been increasingly small relative to the magnitude of balance of
payments crises.
Lastly, the ongoing crisis in peripheral Europe has reminded us, not only
that the global financial crisis is far from over, but also that one of the
major gaps in the international financial architecture is the lack of a regular
institutional framework to manage debt overhangs at the international
level—i.e., a debt court for sovereigns similar to those created to manage
bankruptcies of firms at the national level, the decisions of which are
legally binding.
Comprehensive yet evolutionary reform
The current system is thus proving to be inconsistent with global
macroeconomic and financial stability. There is, therefore, a need for
comprehensive reform, a fact that each new phase of the crisis has made
increasingly clear. What is most interesting: many of the elements of
reform can evolve out of some existing arrangements, as has been
happening in some areas already (e.g., in the issuance of SDRs, new IMF
credit lines, and some capital account regulations), a fact that makes it
more feasible. Reform should respond to two major objectives: global
macroeconomic and financial stability. It should give priority to crisis
prevention, but history also indicates that there is also a significant deficit
of good tools for crisis management, and that the two dimensions are
clearly interlinked.
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elements that a good international monetary and financial architecture
should include: (i) facilitate the consistency of national economic policies
of major countries with the stability of the world economy system, and
avoid negative macroeconomic spillovers, particularly through exchange
rates; (ii) design an international monetary system that contributes to the
stability of the international economy and is considered as fair by all
parties; (iii) regulate the financial and capital markets in all countries, as
well as cross-border transactions, in order to avoid excessive risk
accumulation and moderate the pro-cyclical behavior of such flows; (iv)
offer emergency financing during crises; and (v) provide adequate debt
workout mechanisms at an international level to manage problems of over-
indebtedness. The first two of these elements, as well as the fourth, relate to
global macroeconomic stability, whereas the third and fifth relate to
financial stability. In turn, the first two elements have to do with crisis
prevention and resolution, the third with crisis prevention, and the last
two with to crisis management. However, this distinction is not clear cut,
as latter two may be good for crisis prevention –particularly to avoid a
liquidity crunch from turning into a solvency crisis and moral hazard,
respectively.
The first of these objectives is clearly incorporated at the onset in the
Articles of Agreement of the IMF that state that the first objective of this
institution is to provide “the machinery for consultation and collaboration
on international monetary problems”. However, one of the major
deficiencies of current international arrangements has been the tendency
of major economies to sidetrack the Fund in major efforts at
macroeconomic policy coordination, and to use alternative informal
mechanisms –a pattern that may be called “elite multilateralism”. This is
how the crisis of the early 1970s was managed, leading to the 1971
Smithsonian Agreement, as well as the global imbalances of the 1980s,
which were equally dealt with through the 1985 Plaza Agreement and 1987
Louvre Accord. The G20 is the most recent of these fora, although it uses
the IMF to assist the country-led, consultative Mutual Assessment Process,
a major innovation introduced in the September 2009 Pittsburgh G20
Summit. The best case of a global macroeconomic issue that was at the end
dealt with within the IMF was the creation of the SDRs in the 1960s. A more
recent exercise, the multilateral surveillance approved in 2006, was at the
end insubstantial. The IMF has more recently created a new mechanism of
surveillance that can have multilateral implications, under the name of
“spillover reports”.
REFORMING THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 87Today, the major spillovers are associated with the effects that
uncoordinated monetary policies have on exchange rates, and the
potential effects of issuing an excess supply of the major global reserve
currency. The first relates to the exchange rate system, the second to the
global reserve system.
The major problem in the first case is, of course, the possible
“manipulation” of currencies by countries, an issue that both the IMF and
the G20 have failed to tackle so far, although its definition is incorporated
in Article IV (see above) and in the June 2007 decision on bilateral
surveillance. But beyond that, it can be said that even a more important
problem of the exchange rate system is that it is totally dysfunctional in
facilitating stable trade flows and correcting global payments imbalances.
A major paradox of the current system is, indeed, that there is no
mechanism linking world trade and exchange rate rules. Countries spend
years negotiating trade rules, but exchange rate variations can have within
days more effects on trade than those painstaking deals. On top of that,
exchange rate movements are essentially determined by financial flows,
and may have no effects in terms of correcting global imbalances. The
exchange rate system seems therefore to have failed to meet three
additional objectives also set in the first IMF Article of Agreement: “to
facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade”, “to
promote exchange stability” and to “lessen the degree of disequilibrium in
the international balance of payments”.
The second spillover, associated with the supply of the major reserve
currency, emphasizes the problems faced by the global reserve system:
those generated by the use of a national currency, the U.S. dollar, as the
major global currency, a problem that is today a revised form of the “Triffin
dilemma”. This system faces two major additional problems: the
asymmetric adjustment it imposes on surplus vs. deficit countries, and the
inequities generated by the need that developing countries face to
accumulate foreign exchange reserves to manage the strong pro-cyclicality
of capital flows. The latter generates, in turn, a “fallacy of composition”
that contributes to global imbalances. 
The analysis of these interlinked problems indicates that the system
should be overhauled. Among the several alternatives on the table, the
most logical one is to place the SDRs at the center, in fact fulfilling the
expectations created when this system of cooperation was launched in
1969. This system should also be the basis for a mechanism of balance of
payments financing, which deepens recent IMF reforms and guarantees
that the system is self-financed, in a very similar way to how central banks
money creation and financing operates at the national level. In short,
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facilities, the fourth leg of global monetary reform.
“Excessive” exchange rate volatility associated with capital flows points
to the third leg: capital account regulations. It is useful to recall that a
major agreement during the recent crisis was that deregulated financial
activities can be a source of major macroeconomic disruptions. The G20
has led a major effort to re-regulate finance, mainly at a national level.
However, cross-border finance has been left almost entirely out of the
agenda, as it did not require any regulation or as it was not part of global
finance. A particular twist of language is also involved in analyzing this
issue: domestic financial regulations are called by that name, but if they
involve cross-border flows, they are called “controls”. We would refer to
them by their appropriate name:’ capital account regulations. They could
include “best practices” already in place, such as reserve requirements on
cross-border inflows, minimum stay periods for incoming capital, and
prohibition of certain transactions —e.g., lending in foreign currencies to
economic agents that do not have revenues in those currencies. The
absence of attention to cross-border flows in ongoing regulatory efforts is,
together with lack of clear consensus on how to manage counter-cyclical
prudential regulation, a major gap in current efforts at strengthening
prudential regulation worldwide.
Finally, the lack of a regular institutional framework to manage debt
overhangs at the international level—i.e., a court similar to those created to
manage bankruptcies in national economies, the decisions of which are
legally binding—is one of the major deficiencies of the current
international financial architecture. The only regular institutional
mechanism in place is the Paris Club, which deals exclusively with official
financing. The system has relied in the past on ad-hoc mechanisms, such as
the Baker and Brady Plans of the 1980s and the Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries (HIPC) and the Multilateral Debt Relief (MDRI) Initiatives since
the mid-1990s and 2005, or on traumatic individual debt renegotiations.
The problem with all these mechanisms has been that they generally come
too late, after over-indebtedness has had devastating effects on countries.
The system is also horizontally inequitable, as it does not treat all debtors or
all creditors with uniform rules. 
The discussion of the new international financial architecture should
solve this problem by creating an international debt court, which would
serve both as mediator and, if it fails in that task, as arbitrator of both public
and private sector international disputes involving sovereign debt.
Privately-run restructuring mechanisms, based on the active use of
collective action clauses, are clearly insufficient in this regard. Debtors may
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unlikely to generate a uniform treatment of creditors and fails to treat
official and private lending with a unique set of rules, therefore
maintaining the horizontal inequalities of the current system.
Building an inclusive international financial architecture
Reform of substantive issues affecting the global monetary and financial
system has to be matched by the design of appropriate governance
structures. Good but incomplete steps have been taken in this area. The
most important have been the decision to extend membership of global
financial regulatory institutions to the G20 members, and the inclusion of
major developing countries in the G20 itself, which self-designated itself in
the September 2009 meeting in Pittsburgh as “the premier forum for our
international economic cooperation”. But such “elite multilateralism” also
faces a major problem, as ad-hoc self-appointed bodies cannot replace
representative institutions in a well-structured international financial
architecture.
The reforms of “voice and representation” for developing countries in
the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs) predate the creation of the G20 at
the leaders’ level, and have continued to take place partly on a parallel
track. In April 2008, a modest agreement was adopted on reforming quotas
and votes in the IMF Board, which entailed a redistribution of the quotas
and a tripling of the basic votes to increase the voting rights of developing
countries by 2.7% as a whole. In October 2010, just before the meeting of
Heads of State in Seoul, the Ministers of the G20 agreed on, and the IMF
Board approved in November 2010 a more ambitious reform of IMF
governance. This reform includes doubling the quotas, revising the
allocation of quotas and voting power of developing countries while
protecting those of the poorest countries, reducing by two the European
representatives in the IMF Board and electing all of its members. However,
the increase in the quotas (3.9 percentage points) and voting power
(5.3 points) of developing and transition economies was less than expected
by these countries, and the large gains by some of them (China, Republic of
Korea, Brazil, India, Mexico and Turkey, in that order), which adds up 7.3
and 6.7 percentage points in terms of quota and voting power, respectively,
came partly at the expense of other developing countries.
To these we must add other important proposal made on various
occasions, including by the 2009 Commission for IMF Governance Reform
headed by Trevor Manuel: a reduction in the threshold of votes needed to
approve important IMF reforms from the current 85% to, for example,
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adopt the most important political decisions, thus replacing the
International Monetary and Financial Committee; and a clear redefinition
of the relations between this Council, the Board and the administration.
For its part, in the spring 2010 meetings, the World Bank approved a
transfer of 3.13% of voting power from the developed economies to the
developing and transition economies, which will now hold 47.19% of
voting power and have received a promise that they will reach parity in
the near future. The increases were mainly concentrated in middle-
income countries, especially in Asia, which were under-represented, while
low-income countries saw limited change. This change was achieved
through an ad-hoc capital increase, not through the agreement on a
formula for dynamic revision of capital based on clear principles,
including the Bank’s development mission. There was agreement that this
would be done by 2015.
The G20 has also agreed that the senior management of these
organizations should be chosen on the basis of transparent and open
processes, based on the merit of the candidates, and regardless of
nationality. It would also be useful for the personnel of these institutions to
be more diverse, not just in terms of nationality but also in terms of
education and professional experience, as well as gender.
The broader issues on global financial governance relate, however, to
“elite multilateralism” —i.e., to the G20 itself. The creation of this G at a
leaders’ level was, of course, a step forward compared to the G7, in terms of
representation of developing countries. But this solution also created
problems because of the ad-hoc nature of the cooperation mechanism
adopted, including the way in which the membership was defined, which
implies the exclusion of some large countries (Nigeria is the case that most
clearly stands out) and (once again) the overrepresentation of Western
Europe. 
This preference for “Gs” over representative international institutions
reflects the challenge of overcoming the tension between
representativeness and the legitimacy associated with it, on the one hand,
and existing power structures, on the other. This issue is sometimes
expressed as the tension between inclusiveness and effectiveness, but this
is clearly a wrong way to pose it, as national democracies have shown that
representative institutions can be effective. It reflects rather the revealed
preference by industrial countries for “Gs” over which they can exercise
greater influence.
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on the agenda and facilitating consensus among major powers, no
structure of governance can generate legitimacy as long as decision-making
processes are not inclusive. For this reason, the G20 should be seen as a
transition to a more representative, and thereby legitimate, mechanism of
international economic cooperation. 
One such mechanism would be the Global Economic Coordination
Council proposed by the previously mentioned UN Commission of Experts
on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System, which is
in turn part of a long history of proposals to create a UN “Economic
Security Council”. According to this proposal, the Coordination Council
would be set in the framework of the UN system, to which the BWIs belong
and the WTO would become a member. It would be formed on the basis of
constituencies elected through weighted votes, thus following the model
by which the Boards of the BWIs are made up, though with formulas for
representation that overcome the problems that those institutions face.
Aside from this potential mechanism, the United Nations can play an
important role in global economic governance. It has proven to be a very
effective mechanism for consensus building (notably, in the realm of
finance, the Monterrey Consensus), and in the generation of new ideas and
a framework for international cooperation (in particular, the Millennium
Development Goals), though its effectiveness has been limited by the
tendency to limit its role in the implementation of these agreements and to
severely limit the resources it manages. In retrospect, some of the analytical
contributions of the UN Secretariat on strict global financial issues (by UN-
DESA, UNCTAD and ECLAC, in particular) have been sounder than those
of the Bretton Woods Institutions. The UN has also made important
contributions to these debates through the convening of high level
technical groups, such as the Zedillo and Stiglitz commissions.
Finally, in all of the areas of reform, the global architecture should rely
more broadly on regional institutions. Indeed, in a heterogeneous
international community, the creation of networks of global, regional and
national institutions will provide a better system of governance than
arrangements based on single global organizations. This is based on old
federalist principles: regional and sub-regional institutions give stronger
voice and a sense of ownership to smaller countries. These institutions are,
therefore, more likely to respond to their demands. This has already been
recognized in some areas, such as the system of multilateral development
banks, where the World Bank is complemented by regional development
banks and, in some parts of the world, by sub-regional (in particular, in
THE G20 AND RECOVERY AND BEYOND92Latin America and the Caribbean) and inter-regional banks (the Islamic
Development Bank).
The creation of such an institutional network is particularly urgent in the
monetary arena, where the IMF should make more active use of regional
institutions, such as the Chiang Mai Initiative and the Latin American
Reserve Fund, and support their creation in other parts of the developing
world. Indeed, the IMF of the future should be designed as the apex of a
network of regional reserve funds. Aside from its benefits in terms of
participation by all countries, this design would be much better to promote
macroeconomic policy dialogue and crisis prevention and management at
the world level. A similar institutional design could be adopted for
prudential regulation and supervision, overcoming again the tendency to
manage prudential regulation through elite multilateralism –in this case,
the Financial Stability Board.
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The new phase of the global crisis reinforces the urgent need for a
different world monetary system. Without substantial reforms not only the
possibilities of recovery are blocked but the deleterious forces and
behaviors that led to the crisis will be strengthened. The deepening of that
type of logic among the world’s commanding heights could open a long
period of degradation of civilization by exacerbating the existing trends for
more wars, conflicts, exclusion and social polarization, waste, and
environmental crisis.
The US dollar’s monopoly of international liquidity helps to sustain
global imbalances and, combined with financial deregulation, forces all
non-hard-currency-issuer countries to accumulate reserves in a defensive
way – thus nourishing the same dollar monopoly and sacrificing resources
of productive investment, job creation, and wealth and welfare generation.
The reinforcement of asymmetric macro and microeconomic responses
in an overproduction scenario, besides the unfair anti-competitive
outcome, further nuances the climate of international co-operation and
fosters pressures for trade wars (under the form of currency wars, for
example, with further parity misalignments). The massive bailouts
deployed by certain governments in favor of huge financial institutions
contrasts with the technical, legal and even self-imposed restrictions
created by the majority of countries. In the face of reduced investment
opportunities and with growing concerns clouding confidence on the
structural situation, those resources do not result in more credit, more jobsTHE G20 AND RECOVERY AND BEYOND
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and business practices and the multiplication of bubbles. 
The deployment of these processes has triggered ferocious vectors that
affect the basic mechanisms of market functioning. On one hand, crucial
relative prices become structurally decoupled from the evolution of, for
instance, reproduction costs or seasonal scarcities. In combination with the
currency misalignment, the misleading effects on enterprises’ and
countries’ investment perspectives and specialization could result in large
and painful future corrections with no guarantee of viable and sustainable
allocations in the aftermath. On the other hand, the magnitude and
capillarity of financial transnationalization opens new sources of
vulnerability due to moral hazard, lender of last resort, “creative
accounting” and pervasive deregulation issues. The risks for financial and
macroeconomic stability could compromise peace and democracy.
This note proposes that in order to foster the construction of global
public goods and a climate of co-operation, the global liquidity
arrangements should incorporate the yearly issuance of special drawing
rights (SDRs), without any austerity conditionality (except, perhaps, some
“everything but weapons” condition) and at zero financial cost. This is a
technically viable option – should the political will be found – and one that
would provide additional resources that would support policy space for
national stimuli and reduction of debt acquisition.
The issuance of SDRs would also open up new perspectives for deploying
South-South cooperation initiatives. For example, with small changes in
the IMF’s normative procedures, regional stabilization funds and swap
mechanisms could be supported with part of the members’ SDR quota
without the need to convert these SDRs into hard currencies.
Complementarily, the capabilities of such funds and swap mechanisms
could be improved with a new repertoire of reserve assets like innovative
schemes of natural resources management, as in the Ecuadorean proposal
of “keeping the oil under the soil” for the Sarayacu and Yasuní regions.
With such additional oxygen, it would be possible to reallocate national
central bank reserves to define a regional system of hard currency cushions
and the derived portfolio of regional reserve alternatives.
Moreover, the issuance of regional equivalents of SDRs (like the Latin
American SUCRE) would be a complementary means of payments. Ideally,
the “global” SDRs would be institutionally defined as part of a lender of last
resort scheme for these regional arrangements. In turn, the regional
arrangements could include also, inter alia:
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connecting the national central banks through the electronic systems of
payments, making available a technological platform for new services like a
matrix of multilateral swap mechanisms among central banks (a departure
from the Chiang Mai Initiative);
• The deployment of regionally-focused markets of liquidity (both for
public and private agents) in order to eliminate the stigma still pending
upon some open market operations and fiscal debt issuances in the South
and to recycle the massive amounts of regional savings which usually fly
with low nominal returns and high risks towards financial markets that are
the epicenter of the structural insolvency crisis;
• The creation of new emergency credit facilities as insurance for fiscal
and balance-of payments needs. With the adequate harmonization of
prudential regulation in banking as well as in the financial and exchange
markets, these regional arrangements could have enough power and
credibility to allow for a gradual convergence towards fixed but adjustable
exchange rate systems in line with the long-term equilibrium of the trade
balance, isolating the effects of capital account volatility. Several phases of
convergence should be negotiated according to the economic and political
conditions of each region, including dynamic macroeconomic policy co-
ordination, potentially evolving into a system akin to the old European
Monetary System. 
Even with the same stochastic dynamic optimal control model and the
same parameters of risk aversion and environmental uncertainty, the
optimal accumulation of international reserves for each country must be
reduced with these types of regional arrangements, freeing resources for
productive investment and addressing goals of long-term regional,
environmental and social sustainability through a new kind of
development bank like the Banco del Sur Initiative for UNASUR (South
American Union of Nations), with alternative priorities  (regional
sovereignty in food, energy, health care, science and technology, physical
connectivity, financing of the heterogeneous popular economy, etc.) and
new practices, including the use of domestic and regional currencies.
For the Northern countries, an allocation of SDRs is less important, since
they can usually issue their own fully-convertible hard currency. In most
cases, restrictions for macroeconomic and financial sovereignty are
imposed by Northern countries from within rather than from without.
New contents in the European construction in prioritizing full
employment policies could complete a different scenario of multi-polar,
more democratic global governance.
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too, e.g. the donation of the North’s quota of SDRs in order to fulfill the
promise of increasing official development assistance to 0.7 percent of
GDP. Few technical and normative changes are required to achieve this
without financial cost, inflationary pressures or budgetary disputes (no
country in the North has used the SDRs to finance the deficit). This would
free funds in the order of US$ 150-200 billion per year that could be used
for addressing the most pressing challenges, including support during
humanitarian emergencies and natural disasters; achievement of the
Millennium Development Goals such as the eradication of extreme poverty
and hunger; and measures to counter environmental crises and mitigate
climate change.
In sum, this alternative scheme that combines regional and global
liquidity arrangements with the support of yearly issuances of new SDRs
will open a new horizon of stability. But this also raises the prospect that it
will be politically opposed by very powerful speculative interests that are
currently profiting from the deepening of the crisis. Thus, several
additional regulatory measures must be taken in order to make these efforts
towards a New Global Financial Architecture politically viable. Among
them, I would suggest:
• In order to immediately block the restoration of the blackmailing
powers of the Old Financial Architecture (the IMF has given much more
credit since autumn 2008 than in all previous decades), we need to channel
all new resources that have been already promised or given to the IMF
through a new window. This new window would operate in emergency
terms (cheap and agile), without the neoliberal adjustment conditionality
and with an alternative directory that would reflect a more democratic
representation of the regions. A precedent to study in this regard is the
Global Environment Facility within the World Bank.
• Provide developing countries with real capabilities for deploying
counter-cyclical policies. It is urgent, in this regard, to create fiscal policy
space through measures such as immediate external debt moratoria as
proposed by UNCTAD and the generalization of debt auditing processes
(such as done in Ecuador) and the introduction of an International Debt
Arbitrage Tribunal.
• Universally ban short-selling and other speculative mechanisms like
specific credit default swaps, especially in the global food provision chain
(seeds, products, inputs, etc. both in spot and future markets).
• Implement a universal definition of efficient and transparent capital
regulations and raise a global, though nationally-collected, Financial
Transaction Tax.
THE REFORM OF THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY SYSTEM
OR HOW TO HURRY SLOWLY BUT SURELY
Henri BOURGUINAT
Université de Bordeaux
After Seoul there seems to be a will to attempt to reform the International
Monetary System and it is high time to address this issue. The
undervaluation of the Chinese renminbi is only very slowly fading away
and this as a result poisons the relationships between the USA & China. But
the crisis of payments is not simply limited to this matter and everywhere
the imbalances multiply looming ahead thus justifying the many
endeavours to reform the system deeply. Yet the odds are slim to see a new
Bretton Woods born from the Seoul travails and this for three reasons.
At first because the last meeting of the G20 has confirmed all the
ambiguity of the main actors’ positions: “a truce is taking place on the
currencies war front” so it was pretended but in reality nothing has been
solved. Let us not expatiate on the rule of the + - 4% of GDP of the current
balance that was only an American decoy meant necessarily to hurt the
great exporting nations. In fact at the last minute the Americans backed out
dropping their charge that the renminbi exchange rate was being tampered
with, a statement that would have lead to a charge against China being
filed with the WTO. As a trade off it looks as if the Middle Empire has
renewed its pledge to push for a re-evaluation of the renminbi but at a pace
that it would choose  unilaterally without excluding that such a move
could be a reminder of Mao ‘s long march.
A second event has entered the debate namely the new course taken by
the American monetary policy embodied by the recent instalment of the
second quantitative easing.
The US Federal administration is about to inject $ 600 billion by issuing
treasury bonds bought back by the Fed Reserve while no one has theTHE G20 AND RECOVERY AND BEYOND
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excluded, instead of lowering the long term rates to boost consumption
and investments, they were to fuel international speculation in favouring
the group of assets that we know (gold, shares, raw materials, food supplies,
etc) then the business of the IMF reform would be in dire straights. This
enterprise would risk colliding with a massive arbitration against the dollar
that might muddle everything, particularly for the Euro which would be
viewed as the last recourse to the mis-alignment of the dollar-renminbi
rate. Even worse the loss of control by the American monetary policy
would entail a run on the dollar, undermining its credibility as the central
linchpin of the IMS. Yet nobody can say whether this situation might lead
to a return of inflation, which Americans are quietly wishing for without
loudly voicing it in order to ease their debt, or it would encourage the
present pregnant trend towards deflation. Besides we cannot  rule out that
the USA through a massive use of the money printing press have signalled
to China that if necessary they had a kind of ”nuclear deterrent force” to
notch the yuan up while they themselves are pushing the dollar exchange
rate  down through their own monetary policy. Perhaps, as Milton
Friedman loved to say, one opportunity here to remind others that the
exchange policy is like tango a dance demanding two partners.
Thirdly there is another reason to cast away some illusions on the
immediate plasticity of the IMS for wherever we look around we cannot
make out the new founding principle able to attract a unanimous adhesion
to the justification of a new Bretton Woods.
One way or another returning to the concept of  “target zones” of the
nature of the 1985 Pla za accords precludes a strong consensus to define the
variation brackets and the central rates. Today there are too many parties
involved and gaping chasms do remain between the estimates of the
currencies over/under evaluation. Is it possible to move towards the special
drawing rights being substituted to the dollar as an international currency?
This hackneyed idea that was reintroduced by China herself, on the
condition of creating a special account with the IMF, is not completely an
uninteresting one. Besides the reform of the IFM governance, as accepted
in Seoul, takes effect very appropriately on time. However a strong
objection prevails, for as illustrated by the long history of the Pound
Sterling & the Dollar,  it seems hard to conceive an international currency
since it can only prevail and succeed through being used and one that
would not be adopted by the international markets seems difficult to be
thought of.
The day has yet not come when exports and imports will be invoiced in
SDR. Yet, it is rather on an increased volume of invoices billed in yuan that
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outstanding privilege might add one day that of the Yuan. One way or
another finally it will be of the utmost importance to succeed in separating
sometime the international currency from its own nationality, this step
could even become one of the compulsory moves for the very start of the
reform since it appears now so obviously that making a national currency
the central linchpin of the IMS will lead sooner or later to the loss of
control of the liquidity.
As for the recent avant-garde idea of Fred Bergsten and Daniel Gros to
counterweigh the Chinese buying of American Treasuries by the American
purchasing of Chinese financial assets in order to establish some virtuous
reciprocity it clashes for the moment with a nullifying obstacle namely the
strict control of the flows of capital into China. Furthermore recently even
the proposal made by R. Zoellik, the President of the World Bank, to return
to the gold standard—a fifty year old comeback into the limelight—has
found a new life although the unstoppable bubble of the gold price would
render its implementation hardly possible. Finally perhaps let us not forget
to mention the approach suggested a long time ago to us by Robert Triffin
after his reading one of our articles,23 the path leading to a multicurrency
system called monetary “oligocentrism” ie one composed of a small
number from the Greek “oligos” of international currencies (three or four
with of course tomorrow  the renminbi) which would fluctuate  each one
versus  the others and whose weighed basket would be the cornerstone of
the whole IMF  while nonetheless the tricky problem of defining the
central linchpin would remain.
As can be seen the formulas do exist and others can probably be
conceived. Each one in turn has to be carefully weighed and examined, not
with keeping an eye on the past, but on the contrary with focusing on the
present difficulties without brushing aside the novelties or associations
that might be imposed by China’s march towards power, by the coming of
age of emerging nations, by the American condition and eventually even
the shaky euro situation. In short the work that lies ahead of us is enormous
and a genuine launching window for an immediate reform of the IMF does
not exist yet without at first a thorough effort of clarification. Does this
mean we have to be discouraged and stop acting? This would be the worst
possible reaction for on the contrary we must actively prepare the grounds
23. Henri Bourguinat(1981) “The European monetary system and the Dollar: diversification
versus stability”.Europe and the world-wide Disequilibrium, J.R Sargent ed Sijthoff et
Noordhoff. Voir aussi du même auteur: Finance Internationale, PUF (1995) et Dalloz
(2008)
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(two to three years) heading for the First World Conference of the 21st
century starting with a precise agenda and a wealth of renewed proposals
that would all have been studied in depth. 




The problem with the debate on international macro-economic reform is
that there are too many solutions in search of a problem. Quite apart from
the fact that tinkering around with nominal exchange rates doesn’t solve
anything real, sustainable solutions can only be found when we have
separated the real problems from those that merely sell well on political
soap boxes. 
In the field of international money there are three main problems to be
solved. 
The first is that every country bar one, is well incentivized to develop
policies that are right and good for itself. It is with some irony that many
anglo-saxon friends believe the one is China given the Chinese and Indian
origins of what the Portuguese later called the “Mandarins”. The one
exception is the issuer of the world’s reserve currency. 
This country does not have a budget constraint like others. Goods and
services can be paid for by IOUs never claimed upon. The US is the provider
of the world’s reserve currency today and the last time national spending
was less than nation income was thirty years ago. Issuers of paper
currencies held as reserves are prone to excessive debt-financed
consumption that ultimately sinks the standard, drowning everyone else
on it. Trying to constrain the hegemon, often in its own long-run interests,
is the Sysphusian goal of the rest of the world. 
The second problem is that in the natural state of affairs, is a single
reserve currency. This is because there are strong network effects. If one
asset is known to offer liquidity and value in a crisis, it becomes a self-
fulfilling prophecy that draws liquidity and value from all other assets. This
concentration of world reserves into one asset, vulnerable to beingTHE G20 AND RECOVERY AND BEYOND
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observing today and as President De Gaul observed in 1970. Without
sufficient vigilance by the monetary authorities of the reserve issuer, the
concentration of international savings and its potential is able to fan the
flames of an unsustainable boom in the issuing currency with potentially
highly adverse consequences—as we have seen. 
If half the world wants to spend and the other half wants to save, perhaps
because they have a commodity windfall like Russia, Brazil and Saudi
Arabia, or they are already investing a large amount of GDP or have an
overhang from some past over-investment, as in China, where 50% of GDP
is invested, or Japan and Korea, and these countries invest these savings
internationally in countries that want to spend, is this not a measure of an
international monetary system working well? The problem of global
imbalances is not that imbalances exist, but that there is a concentration of
spending and saving that is aggravated by a single reserve currency.  
John Maynard Keynes was exercised by another problem, which is what
would happen if the issuer of the world reserve currency was a surplus
country as in 1940s America. This would be deflationary, but we have been
saved that particular misfortune today. It is worth mentioning, however, as
it was the background to his ideas around bancor, that are being re-floated
today. 
A solution to these real problems is often weighed down by genuine
concerns over other legitimate problems that are best solved through other
means than international monetary reform. These include the scourge of
world poverty, the unconvertibility of some developing country currencies
and the human and social consequences of adjusting to lost
competitiveness. But if reform to the international monetary system
appears artificial and “soft” they will not convince those charged with
protecting their country’s financial balances and will be still born. The
dustbin of history is choc-a-bloc with utopian currency ideas. 
The solution would be for the IMF, or another treaty-based organization
to issue a new currency, but not a basket currency or some grown up unit of
account, not something handed out free to those with unconvertible
currencies or anyone else, but something hard. The guardians of this hard
currency would have as a primary objective to ensure that it would never
systematically depreciate versus any of today’s major currencies. It would
not be backed by any paper currency, but by a basket of real assets,
independently certified and income-producing, limited to world resources
that are consumed by unsustainable economic expansion. Imagine a basket
of sustainable forests and water resources.  Reserve managers could be
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diversified. By being convertible, marketable and with a remit to be strong,
this currency would be an attractive store of value. By investing in income
producing real assets it would be liquid and by being internationally
diversified, we address the problems associated with concentration. The
accumulation of reserve assets would not be financing an unsustainable
asset-price boom in a narrow set of countries, or an income-sapping
investment by others, but an investment in all of our futures. 
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At the national level 2010 was a mixed year for progress on climate
change: many developed countries hesitated, as in some of Europe, or
stepped back as in the USA; on the other hand many developing countries
moved forward as in China’s 12th five-year plan, India’s action on
renewables and energy efficiency, and Brazil and Indonesia on forestry. At
the international level, after the disappointment and acrimony of the
UNFCCC meeting in Copenhagen in December 2009, the progress was
largely positive; the consolidation of the Copenhagen Accord in terms of
emissions commitments for 2020, the agreements in Nagoya in October at
the Convention on Biodiversity and the agreement in Cancun at the
UNFCCC (COP16) on climate change. The G20 Seoul summit in November
was broadly positive, including, its welcoming of the work of the UN
Secretary-General’s advisory group on climate change financing. Business
commitments have continued to move forward with rapid technical
progress, investment in renewables, and further pressure on the political
process to create a stronger and clearer policy environment, as in the G20
Business Summit in Seoul.
There is some momentum and a modest international platform for
further progress in 2011, building to COP17 in Durban, South Africa at the
end of the year. But, for progress to be major, strong leadership under the
French Presidency of the G20 is required. For developed countries, whose
attention has been diverted by the financial and economic crises this must
include helping to overcome wavering commitment. For developing
countries, it must include fostering the recognition that an alleged trade-
off between reducing emissions and overcoming poverty is largely false.
Both of these can be achieved if we focus on the understanding of three key
issues; recognition of the necessary scale of adjustment; the attraction ofTHE G20 AND RECOVERY AND BEYOND
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complementarity between action on climate change and resolving the
international macro challenges of this coming decade.  
1) World discussions have accepted the ‘2°C target’, specifically
understood as around a 50/50 chance of holding average world
temperature increases relative to the mid 19th century to 2°C. But they have
not faced clearly and honestly the quantitative reductions which are
required. We must as a world, to achieve this target, reduce global
emissions, which are currently around 48 billion tonnes of carbon-dioxide
equivalent in 2010, to around 44 in 2020, well below 35 in 2030, and well
below 20 in 2050: in other words from around 7 tonnes per capita now to
around 2 in 2050. Or with a moderately growing world economy (say
multiplying by a factor of 3 in 40 years) cutting emissions per unit of
output by a factor of between 7 and 8. This means a new industrial
revolution starting now. World leaders have not yet recognised fully these
implications of the 2°C target. And they probably have not yet fully
understood the magnitude of the risks of missing the target in terms of the
significant probabilities of 3, 4 or 5°C by the end of the century,
temperature increases (certainly in the case of 4 or 5°C) which would
transform where many hundreds of millions can live. Without clear
understanding of the necessary scale of adjustment, progress may be
dangerously slowed. The G20 is the right forum for this clarity on the
necessary economic and industrial transformation.
2) The politics, however, of embracing the necessary scale becomes much
more attractive if we recognise that the transition to a low-carbon economy
will be full of creativity, innovation and growth. It is the growth story. This
is a narrative which must be set out, strongly and clearly at the most senior
level. Past economic transformations, from the mechanisation of textile
production in the 18th century, to steam and railways in the 19th century,
to information technology in the 20th, have brought 2 or 3 decades of
dynamic growth, with investment flowing to the pioneers. This
technological transformation, with its necessity rooted in the huge market
failure of unpriced greenhouse gas emissions, requires strong national and
international policy.
Korea and China have seen this clearly. Indeed, in many ways, the most
significant economic event of 2010 was the announcement of the outline
of the 12th five-year plan for China (2011 – 2015). The two key themes are
(a) the advance of the Chinese consumer and (b) the transition to a low-
carbon economy. Seven sectors the (‘magic seven’) are targeted to grow
from 3% to 15% of the economy by 2020 on top of an overall 8% growth
rate. The industries are in large measure ‘green tech’ and the investment
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Europe, that partner with China will see immense advantages. If Europe
and East Asia move strongly, the external reality for the United States could
change within a decade, in terms of damaging prospects for dirty exports
and being left behind technologically. This could, in turn, intensify
pressures for change in the internal politics of the USA. The OECD in Paris
and the Global Green Growth Institute in Korea will be leaders in the
analysis of this story. So too should be the IFIs. Europe has much to gain by
strengthening its commitment from 20% to 30% reductions (1990-2020)
and promoting technological collaboration with East Asia. It should not be
put off by the siren calls of narrow short-term vested interests, and should
embrace the more dynamic growth story. The green race has begun and the
pioneers will have great advantages.
3) The big shorter-term international macro challenges of the next few
years and this decade, must be examined in the context of this medium and
longer-term story of the next industrial revolution and the transition to
low-carbon growth. In this decade we must handle four related
international macro issues: (i) major world savings and investment
imbalances manifesting themselves in trade imbalances, (ii) very large
deficits and debts in the public finances of key countries (iii) fragile growth,
particularly in the richer countries and (iv) unfinished business in financial
and capital market reform. All of these will be easier to handle, not more
difficult, if we set them in the context of the two profound structural
changes of the next 2 or 3 decades: the transition to the low-carbon
economy; and the re-drawing of the international division of labour—the
movement of low-cost manufacturing out of the rich countries was just a
beginning.
The G20 is surely the place where these shorter-term macro challenges
can and must be integrated with longer-term structural change. We
damage both the shorter and longer—term if we separate them out. In this
case the strong investment in low-carbon infrastructure and new
technologies should be at the heart of the economic recovery in the rich
world and of the structure of growth in the developing world.
If there is leadership in the G20 on the three key issues identified at the
start of this note, then the creation of the necessary coalitions to tackle the
challenges of (a) international macro-management, (b) overcoming
poverty and promoting international development and (c) managing
climate change, will be much more likely. The G20 is the place where the
integration of action on these challenges can and must be put together. We
damage the prospects for action if we separate our responses to these
challenges. In this context key areas for action in 2011 are taking forward
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climate finance and implementing the Seoul development consensus and
action plan.
We must simultaneously foster local and national action and collaborate
to create an international agreement on climate change. There is no
contradiction in this sense between bottom-up and top-down. On the
contrary they support each other. And we need not be excessively formal in
the notion of a ‘binding agreement’. The key is confidence in where other
countries are going, so that in domestic politics people feel part of a bigger
story and in business, investors see growing markets for the new
technologies and serious risk in the old high-carbon methods.
Understanding the economies and policies of other countries is of
fundamental importance. China’s 12th five-year plan is a good place to
start. It is a much clearer commitment to a low-carbon future, essentially a
contract between China’s government and its own people, than, say,





Global recovery is underway. But the prospects of the global economy
are not encouraging. First, in the long-term run, the potential growth rate
of developed economies will be low, due to a slower growth rate of working
age-population and the likely stagnant in labor productivity. Second, fiscal
positions of almost all developed countries are worsening rapidly. Now
total global debt stands at 41 trillion US dollar, a 24 percent rise from 33
trillion US dollar in 2009. These two facts imply that a global sovereign
debt crisis is looming large in the future.
Before the subprime crisis struck in 2007, most economists would agree
that global imbalances were the most important threat to global growth. It
was commonly theorized that the rise of the net foreign debt-to-GDP ratio
(NIIP/GDP ratio) of the US, as a result of the accumulation of current
account deficits, would lead to a sudden stop of capital inflows, which in
turn would lead to a fall in the dollar and a rise in the interest rates, and
hence a crisis of the US economy. However, the scenario failed to
materialize. Instead of an international balance payments crisis, the
subprime crisis broke out. Why did most economists fail to predict the
economic dynamics that actually led to the crisis correctly? The reason is
that most economists failed to pay enough attention to the rapid increase
in total debt and all its major components, and only narrowly focused on
just one component of total debt-- foreign debt and the change in the
foreign debt –current account deficit. Foreign debt is a result of deficiency
of domestic funds for the finance of total debt. It should not occupy a too
special attention in comparison with other forms of indebtedness. In fact,
while the net foreign debt-to-GDP ratio was 24 percent in 2007, the
magnitudes of other major debts were way larger (Figure 1) .THE G20 AND RECOVERY AND BEYOND
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+ Business debt. Here financial debt is excluded from total debt to prevent
double 
In Q3 of 2008, the US total debt-to-GDP ratio has surpassed 358 percent.
More specifically, the three components of total debt are mortgage and
consumer debt, government debt, and non-financial corporate debt. Debt
must be financed. (See appendix)
For any debt positions such as foreign debt, mortgage debt, public debt
and business debt, there are problems of sustainability, individually. The
sustainability of debt means not only total debt but also each component
can be financed continuously. While different debts have different natures,
all debts and their finance are interconnected. Troubles in any component
of total debt will impact on the other components. For example, the
subprime crisis has changed the dynamics of America’s current account
deficit, leading to a temporary improvement in the account. The public
sector leveraging in 2009 aimed at preventing further slowdown of the
economy caused by the collapse of the mortgage debt market has led to the
rapid worsening of America’s public debt position. 
It can be seen that the net foreign debt is the difference between US total
debt and US total assets (plus equity). Correspondingly, American current
account deficit is equivalent to the deficiency of funds for financing US
household debt, government debt and corporate debt.
Hence, the problem of global imbalances, which is characterized by the
US current account deficit vis-à-vis current account surplus of the rest of
the world, is just part of the problem of the funding deficiency of US total
debt. The funding deficiency can be divided into four interconnected
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households, funding deficiency of the government, funding deficiency of
nonfinancial corporate and funding deficiency of a country. In a closed
economy, the funding deficiency of one or two sectors must be
supplemented by other one or two sectors with funding surplus. In an open
economy, foreign funds can flow in to make up the funding deficiency of
the country.  
When the sustainability of US current account deficit is discussed, the
focus is on the sustainable level of the US net foreign debt-to-GDP ratio.
Though it is easy to decide the steady state of the net foreign debt-to-GDP
ratio under given assumptions, it is very hard to decide at what level the net
foreign debt-to-GDP ratio will become unsustainable. The net foreign debt-
to-GDP ratio is not a good measurement of the sustainability of US current
account deficit, because, for foreign creditors, the most important and
direct concern is the safety of and returns on the particular US assets they
have invested in, rather than the repayment ability of the country as a
whole. The reason why the expected crisis caused by global imbalances
failed to materialize is that, despite the high net foreign debt-to-GDP ratio,
foreign demand for US financial assets, especially US government securities
was still very strong. For example, for Chinese investors (the Central Bank),
the main concern is with the safety of and return on US government
securities. As long as the US dollar will not fall significantly, the worsening
of America’s external position will not become a major concern for foreign
investors. With hindsight, economists should have paid more attention to
the sustainability of US domestic debt, especially mortgage debt. The
mistake can be seen more clearly, if we notice that the mortgage and
consumer debt-to-GDP ratio in 2007 was more than 83 percent, compared
with the 24 percent of the net foreign debt-to-GDP ratio. The break out of
the subprime crisis and its aftermath show that overextension of mortgage
debt relative to incomes of borrowers (NINJA) made US mortgage and
consumer debt unsustainable. As prices of MBS and CDO fell dramatically,
mortgage debts were unable to roll-over, and a vicious cycle set in. The
deleveraging by financial institutions made the funding deficiency worse.
Without government intervention, interest rates on mortgages and other
financial assets would rise dramatically, the US dollar probably would fall,
and defaults would be prevalent, until a new equilibrium was found. The
global financial crisis was caused by over-indebtedness. Any long-term and
fundamental solution must deal with the over-indebtedness issue.
However, to bring total debt down to a sustainable position, high costs
must be paid. Mortgage and consumer debt can be paid down by
households with their savings or by default of borrowers. In the former
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demand and hence a slowdown of economic growth (a rise in
unemployment). In the latter case, the creditors would incur huge losses
and the economic may fall into a deeper recession. The US government has
chosen a politically easier solution. By schemes such as TALF, TARP and
QE1, prices of “toxic assets” were artificially prompted up.  In other words,
funds escaped from the mortgage and consumer debt market were offset by
funds pumping in by the government. Private creditors were replaced by
the government and risks were shifted from private creditors into tax
payers in general. The issue of fairness aside, the government intervention
in the mortgage and consumer debt has led to a dramatic increase in public
debt. Where will funds come from to finance the increased public debt?
There are three possible sources: funds released from the mortgage and
consumer debt market, new domestic funds resulted from higher household
savings, and foreign funds. The rapid increase in the supply of public debt
will become a serious threat to the sustainability of public, unless
household savings can increase correspondingly. Now while the balance of
household debt has been restored at a knife edge, the sustainability of
public debt is becoming a new flash point of global financial instability.
The QE II is outright money printing and cannot be regarded as normal
open market operations. The launch of the QEII shows that financial
markets are no longer able to provide funds—loanable funds to finance US
government budget deficit. QEII is an action of desperation. 
By the end of 2010, US public debt is above 14 trillion USD (Figure 2). The
public debt-to-GDP ratio is more than 90 percent and it is forecasted that by
the end of 2020, interest payment on government debt will be more than 30
percent of government revenues. The issue of sustainability of US public debt
seems a more serious problem than that of US current account deficit.
If the US private sector is not in a position to provide surplus funds to
satisfy the need for financing public debt, the only possible source of
finance is foreign funds. However, this means that the US must tolerate
current account deficit. Otherwise, virtually there will be no way for the US
to get enough funds to prevent a crash in the public debt market.
Unfortunately, the European Sovereign Debt Crisis is far from over. Only
feasible source of funds is emerging economies, especially China and oil
producing countries. If foreign funds stop flowing into the US government
bond market, and/or other capital markets to release domestic funds to
supplement the government bond market, a public debt crisis may be
inevitable. Tricks such as QEII can buy time but will not solve the problem.
From the point of view of China, it is difficult to understand why the
Chinese government should be so reluctant to reduce its current account
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while the securities are facing the danger of down-grading. From the point
of view of the US, it is even more difficult to understand why the US
government has been so intransigent in demanding China to reduce its
current account surplus against the US, while it needs foreign funds to
finance its budget deficit badly. 
Figure 2.  US government Debt
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broader framework, which takes into consideration total debt and total
assets, and all major debt-finance links, the sustainability of global
imbalances is still an important issue. Definitely, sooner or later, China will
cut its current account deficit in a more earnest manner, because consensus
has begun to arrive at recently that it is not in the interest of China to
continue to pile up foreign exchange reserves by buying more US
government securities, the value of which has already been diluted by the
Fed’s pump-priming. If the US government fails to find a way to cut its total
debt, the fall in prices of US government bonds and the rise of the yields on
these bonds will be inevitable.
The US needs both financial stability and growth. To achieve one should
not at the expense of another. A sudden stop due to worsening of current
account deficit is not an immediate threat. Until the US government and
Fed have sold those toxic assets without causing upheaval in the capital
market, we cannot say that the problem of household debt has been solved.
Public debt has been worsening fast. The debt problem can be solved
basically in two ways: the hard way—default and the soft way—pay down
the debt by savings. There are two ways to increase savings: reduce
consumption and make the economy growth faster. From America’s point
of view, it seems that the idea solution is to achieve higher growth by
increasing exports. Suppose that by devaluation of the US dollar vis-à-vis
the RMB, US current account deficit falls to zero, which, other things being
equal, implies that the US economy grows correspondingly. Growth of the
economy should increase government tax revenues, and hence the public
borrowing requirements will be reduced. The need for foreign funds to
finance budget deficit will be reduced at the same time. In this process,
both current account deficit and government deficit will be reduced. This
means that the growth rate of total debt has been reduced, while economic
growth has also been achieved. The flip-side of the scenario is the
weakening of the position of the dollar as the international reserve
currency, and the possible negative impacts of the devaluation of the dollar
on the rest of the global economy.
To allow the US to achieve a smooth adjustment by reducing total debt
(or lower the growth rate of total debt) and increasing exports,
international coordination is needed. On the other hand, US policies
should be conducive to the maintenance of growth in developing
economies and guarantee the integrity of the dollar. This means that the
US should resist the temptation to inflate away its debt burden and shifting
the burden of adjustment to the rest of the world.
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surplus countries is worth considering. However, this commitment must be
combined with other commitments such as reducing budget deficit,
reducing total debt-to-GDP ratio, controlling over operation of print press
and so on. The coordination should be aimed at maintaining the growth
momentum of the global economy, maintaining the financial stability and
distributing the burden of adjustment in a fair way.
Appendix
Total debt must be equal to total assets +equity. But total debt is not
necessary equal to its domestic assets +equity. Taking into consideration
foreign claims on the US, we have the following relationship.
Mortgages and consumer credits of American households +American public
debt + American business debt = MBS, CDO and other assets, US government
securities, corporate stocks and bonds, held by Americans + [(foreign
Miscellaneous Assets, US government securities, other bonds, corporate stocks,
held by Americans, and outbound FDI) –(MBS, CDO and other assets, US
government securities, corporate stocks and bonds, held by foreigners, and
inbound FDI)]
Equivalently, we have
Net foreign debt = (mortgages and consumer credits of American households –
MBS,CDO and deposits, held by American ) + (American public debt – US
government securities, held by Americans) + (American business debt – corporate
stocks and bonds and deposits, held by Americans)
In flow terms, we have 
Current account deficit = Δ(mortgages and consumer credits of American
households – MBSΔCDO and consumer bank loans, held by Americans) +
Δ(American public debt- government bonds held by Americans) + Δ(American
business debt – shares and  corporate bonds and business bank loans, held by
Americans)
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DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
AT A TURNING POINT
François BOURGUIGNON
Paris School of Economics
Very much criticism has been heard lately about Official Development
Assistance by developed countries to developing countries. It is often seen
as ineffective in promoting growth and reducing poverty. Even when
restricted to social objectives like education or health, it is also found to be
counterproductive through encouraging corruption and lack of
accountability of political leadership with respect to their constituency, or
even foreign donors. At the same time, it is difficult to imagine how a
number of low-income countries would do in providing basic social
services to their population without existing foreign assistance and how
they could invest more heavily in infrastructure to promote faster growth
without an increase in foreign assistance. 
Development assistance is today at a turning point. If it makes little
doubt that it needs to be increased overall, several factors suggest that the
old model of aid delivery by a few official donors must be seriously revised
to avoid it becoming still less effective. 
Among the factors that push for a drastic change are the following.
The 'new' donors. Reflecting the asymmetry of economic growth in the
developing world, the so-called emerging countries are increasingly
present in poorer countries, most importantly in Sub-Saharan Africa. In a
few years, China has been able to increase its funding of African
development from practically zero to maybe 5 or $ 6 billion a year. The new
donors often operate in the 'old' diplomacy-related style but they deliver
aid in sectors and in ways radically different from those used by traditional
donors, possibly making the latter less attractive and comparatively less
effective. A good example of this is the focus of Chinese aid on
infrastructure—an area long abandoned by traditional donors. THE G20 AND RECOVERY AND BEYOND
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ineffective, constituencies in donor countries can hardly be convinced to
increase their effort, especially at a time of an economic slowdown.
Moreover, observing how the new donors operate creates pressure to revert
to old diplomacy-related aid model and away from multilateralism and
restrictive DAC rules. 
The growing sense of sovereignty and the increasing expertise in
beneficiary countries are sapping further the old conditionality based aid
model. Yet, aid cannot be exclusively delivered under the form of budget
support, especially in 'fragile' countries. 
The multiplication of aid actors. Because of some lack of transparency
in multilateral agencies as well as the fear of corruption in beneficiary
countries, several specialized multilateral funds have recently developed
(GAVI, HIV/Malaria, …) in addition to existing specialized UN agencies. An
increasing number of NGOs operate in the aid area funded both by private
and public donors. Philanthropic foundations like the Gates and Buffet
foundation are also increasingly active. The total amount of funds
channeled towards developing countries by these 'private' actors was
recently estimated to be around $ 50 billion a year, 40 per cent of total DAC
aid. The increasing number of aid actors makes problems of coordination
and harmonization, already serious among traditional donors, still more
acute and potentially harmful to effectiveness. 
Financial development.  Globalization and innovation have
substantially increased international flows in development finance with
the effect of reducing the relative importance of aid flows, even in
countries with limited access to international capital markets. This leads
some observers to anticipate that private flows can progressively substitute
for ODA. It is to be hoped that, together with more domestic resources, this
will indeed happen in the long-run. For the time being, however, the issue
is how to best combine the two types of flows while taking into account the
relative role of private and public actors in development. 
New tools.  Innovations have taken place that may greatly modify the
way to assist people in low income countries. Cash transfer policies of
different types (conditional on the schooling of children, lump-sum
pensions, etc..) can be effectively implemented today at relatively low cost
thanks to the development of smart cards and mobile phones. Person to
person transfers between developed and developing countries, including
migrant remittances, become possible through these tools and internet. At
the aggregate level, regular flows of foreign funds, including foreign aid,
may be leveraged to increase the volume of investible resources, possibly
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assistance must take into account all these changes. 
The focus on Sub-Saharan Africa and other poor countries. Although
some progress has been recorded over the last decade in the pace of Sub-
Saharan African growth, the region still lags behind most other developing
countries both in income levels and rates of growth. With current trends,
global poverty will increasingly become an African problem over the next
20 years. On the other hand, it is not clear that the good performance of
African countries over the last couple of years reflects on average more than
favorable commodity prices and that commodity exports could be a
powerful long-run development engine. Under these conditions,
development assistance should increasingly focus on that region. It should
also go beyond standard aid to cover other ways of creating the conditions
for sustained development there (most notably through effective trade
preferences).
Climate change and global public goods are opening new
opportunities or new obligations to foreign development assistance.  The
anticipation that global warming will predominantly affect negatively the
poorest countries has led to a reflection on how to mobilize resources to
finance adaptation to the climate change. The High-Level Advisory Group
on Climate Change Financing just released a report on how to mobilize $
100 billion/year by 2020. An important issue is how to make sure that this
funding will be truly additional and will not affect ODA flows. The same
applies to other global public goods or 'global public bads' likely to affect
poor countries: conflict prevention, trade infrastructure, pandemics
prevention, etc… Globalization entails the development of global negative
externalities that may hinder the economic development of poor
countries. It is essential for them to be fully compensated without implicit
reduction of ODA flows. 
Such are the challenges that traditional and new ODA, whether public or
private, is facing. Clearly, the old model of a few donors and a few bilateral
or multilateral agencies financing specific projects or sectoral programs in
developing countries fits less and less well this context. Yet, 'project aid'
still is the dominant form of aid delivery today, both by public agencies as
well as NGOs or private foundations. The major risk that is being faced with
the present organization (or disorganization) of aid is an increase in its
effectiveness for lack of coordination of the various actors, both in donor
and in recipient countries. From that point of view, it is somewhat
surprising that rather little was said in the Seoul Development Consensus
promoted at the G20 summit in Korea about the implementation of the
general strategic principles listed in the communiqué. There definitely is an
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communiqué. But the issue of implementation and the best way of
federating all the energies to reach the development goals reiterated in that
document has received little attention. The decisions taken in previous
conferences on aid effectiveness in Paris and Accra were too general, mostly
focused on traditional donors and old aid delivery mechanisms and
ignorant of the new context and new challenges to aid delivery. 
The whole traditional aid system has become too complicated, involving
too many actors and too many dimensions to be handled through
conventional planning and coordination tools. It is necessary to think
about innovative ways of handling aid in order not to lose and possibly
gain effectiveness. Beyond principles, it should be the task of the G20 to
propose ways to reach that objective, especially in view of the conference
on aid to take place at the end of the year in Korea. From that point of view,
a few practical and inter-related principles might be kept in mind for
designing an adequate and effective aid system.
Transparency should be the master word.  Aid is presently ineffective (or
is perceived so) precisely because of the lack of transparency of the whole
system. If all donors were transparent about the way their aid is allocated
among countries, and possibly among sectors, if serious impact evaluation
was undertaken of all specific projects or programs supposedly funded by
foreign assistance, if recipient countries were transparent about their
public expenditures, including those funded by foreign assistance, if they
were seriously monitoring their development progress and the
effectiveness of their own policies, again through rigorous impact
evaluations of some of their major programs, things would be
fundamentally different from what they are today. Transparency would
reveal ineffectiveness and ineffectiveness would be corrected, in donor
countries because of tax payers' pressure, recipient countries because of
popular control and the risk that aid flows would fall if effectiveness is seen
to be limited. 
Relying more on budget support
Provided it is possible to get real transparency in recipient countries,
then budget support rather than project aid must become the norm. The
problems arising from the lack of coordination of aid actors and lack of
harmonization of their modus operandi will be reduced in the same
proportion as the increase in the share of budget support in total aid. Also,
actors concerned with these problems will increasingly be private actors,
supposedly more flexible in their operations. In Sub-Saharan Africa, budget
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less as a proportion of total aid. 
Decentralization to specialized (public or private) agencies 
Outside budget support, it is not clear that national development
agencies are the most efficient instruments to directly manage project or
program aid when dealing with a multiplicity of countries and project
types. Specialized agencies, whether public or private, would certainly do
much better and this may be a reason for the relative good performance of
various UN agencies or global funds. Project aid delivery already works a
little as a market where operators specialized in a given field and a given set
of countries collect aid from donors and are responsible for the
implementation of a specific project. Provided that these operators are fully
transparent, it would be possible to go beyond this, however. Operators
could be managing their own projects, using the most efficient tools
available and designing innovative ones, and would attract more or less aid
from donors depending on the results they have been able to show through
careful evaluation of their operations.  In effect, private aid is more or less
managed in that way. The problem is that it may not be extremely effective
because money is not collected on the basis of a rigorous evaluation of the
action of operators but through advertisement campaigns. One could even
imagine that operators would be rated by some entity representing the
community of public and private donors.
Division of labor
The preceding principles (budget support, decentralization) already rely
on a clearer division of labor in aid delivery. Addressing some of the
challenges above also requires making sure the adequate allocation of aid
funds across areas of interventions (global public goods vs. development
objectives) and geographical areas (Sub-Saharan Africa and other poor
slow-growing countries vs. other regions). It will probably be difficult to
achieve this through loose coordination of donors. Part of the solution
consists of entrusting part of this allocation process to multilateral
institutions specialized in financing actions in given areas or regions (like
Regional Development Banks). For global public goods, this will probably
require either creating new institutions or delegating the management of a
specific area – e.g. adaptation to global warming – to existing multilateral
institutions like the World Bank or the IMF. 
 These principles are indicative of directions for in depth reflection on
the necessary reforms of the aid sector. It might be thought that the
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extremely complicated. This is not completely true. Traditional DAC
donors are still responsible for two thirds of total development assistance in
the world. Reforming the way they manage and deliver their aid would
necessarily have a huge impact at the global level and will affect the way in
which other donors, public or private, operate. In effect, it is most likely
that other actors will join. In particular, nothing should prevent emerging
countries in the G20 to join traditional donors on specific reforms or to
adopt some of the previous practical principles.  
PROPOSAL FOR AN AID MODEL
James MIRRLEES
Chinese University of Hong Kong &
Trinity College, Cambridge24
In 2000, the nations of the world adopted the UN Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs); which include the reduction of extreme
poverty, disease, child mortality, climate change and gender inequalities,
and the improvement of primary education and maternal health. The
MDGs are the only credible framework for the international community's
response to these problems. 
The MDG programme needs funds. The 192 UN member governments
backed these goals. The developed nations pledged to raise their aid to the
developing nations to 0.7 per cent. of their national incomes to meet the
need. Only five of them have so far reached this target. Most contribute less
than half the pledged level. In 2009, the shortfall was $146B, roughly 56%.
If the promised contributions to achieving the MDGs are not achieved,
there will be greater human misery and global insecurity. The MM Aid
Model provides a way for Nations to move faster toward meeting this
funding shortfall.
The MM Model – Transforming Aid  
Matching private donations
Donations can be increased both by greater public awareness of the good
done by fulfilling the commitments of the MDGs; and by increasing the
incentive to make donations.  We propose that governments use part of
their overseas development assistance (ODA) budgets to match private
24. This note  is an abbreviated statement of a proposal that Renu Mehta  (Director of Fortune
Forum, London) and I have developed.THE G20 AND RECOVERY AND BEYOND
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would achieve twice as much as the donation on its own, considerably
increasing the incentive to donate. These private contributions, along with
the matching public funds, would be channelled through to a special fund,
to be set up by government or the government aid agency. We call this
fund the Global Development Fund (GDF). Matching would be
conveniently achieved for most people by allowing them to make
voluntary donations to the GDF along with their tax payments. 
Every donation made to the GDF by a private individual, a foundation or
trust, or a company should be matched by an equal contribution from the
government’s aid budget earmarked for matching; a part that, in the
absence of the scheme, would have gone to government aid agencies
directly and unconditionally. Donations to the GDF can be made along
with income-tax payments and corporation tax payments, and may take
the form of legacies. Donations may be made by non-domiciled and non-
resident income earners, and from accumulated wealth, including funds
held offshore. Funds to match private donations would come from the aid
budget: a substantial part of the budget would be so used. 
Tax payers would be invited to donate at least 0.7 per cent of their
taxable income. That amount would be collected with their tax payments,
unless they chose to opt out, or chose a different level of donation. This
proportion echoes the commitment to increase government development
assistance to 0.7 per cent of GDP. Businesses would similarly be invited to
donate a minimum of 0.7 per cent of their net trading profits. We would
expect many higher income earners and businesses to donate a greater
proportion than 0.7 per cent.
 If implemented by all OECD nations the model should bring in new
money of more than US$100 billion per year. To achieve such a high level
of additional donations, all OECD member states would have to implement
various aspects of the MM Model such as additional monitoring of funds
and specialist donor support. An exceptional matching incentive alone will
not work—Governments have to accept an independent evaluation
process.
.  Achieving and demonstrating successful aid
The GDF, in association with the government’s development agency,
needs to do a serious job of allocating its funds. It must establish rigorous
monitoring arrangements to provide appropriate incentives for the
governments, agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
receiving its funds to act and cooperate effectively. It should counter the
inefficient use of development assistance, and reduce losses to wasteful
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donations to these causes are so much less than their importance requires. 
To increase donor motivation largely depends on the creation of this
specialist investment vehicle, GDF, designed to ensure that the donors’
resources are delivered with the highest possible impact. We suggest that a
GDF index of independently-audited projects and initiatives should rank
aid expenditures by their impact and results. That would provide a
competitive environment amongst grantees. It would reward good
performance, improve or eliminate inefficient programmes, and facilitate
better coordination of aid efforts. The result would be a higher yielding
portfolio of development programmes. The GDF would have two tasks of
the first importance, to assess performance and to inform public
perceptions.
.  Transparency to build public confidence
The GDF would have the responsibility of monitoring the effectiveness
of its expenditures, and publicising achievements, to show that the donors’
performance expectations are met, and communication with the private
sector. By doubling donations, and channelling them through a trusted
body, we seek to create a large multiplier effect to attract donations from
the private sector. Donors are to be given good information about
development programmes they have financed through the GDF,
information that should be publicly and transparently available.  
Donors contributing through the GDF can be confident that their giving
will be channelled successfully, because of the GDF’s independent audit of
the whole distribution process, from the criteria driving allocation of funds
across the eight MDGs through to assessment of the effectiveness of
proposed recipients, and subsequent evaluation of results obtained. 
Spending to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, which can be
greatly increased by the MM Model, would give the world’s poor access to
food, shelter, education, water, healthcare, a cleaner environment and
greater equality; and protect future populations from the risk of excessive
global warming. It deserves the highest priority.
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G20 should not supplant existing multilateral institutions since they
have universal membership, accumulated expertise and insights. The G20
can only supplement the working of these institutions and provide overall
guidance as appropriate.  
G20 should not, therefore, have a separate permanent secretariat.
Informality is its strength and, therefore, its deliberations and outcomes
should not be driven by own secretariat.  
The current mechanism of working groups on an adhoc basis also provides
a greater sense of participation to different countries, depending on their
stakes and their relevance. For instance, it is not an accident that India and
Canada are closely involved in some of the critical working groups. 
Moreover, it must be recognized that G20’s importance has been
basically contextual and perhaps rightly so. When there are challenges,
there is a greater compulsion to coordinate. When there are more normal
times, all the institutions that have been established for specific purposes
should have the policy space to conduct their activities as per their
mandate. It is recognized that there is a deficit in the governance of many
of these institutions. However, it is natural that the importance of G20 will
diminish, and should diminish, as and when the governance in these
institutions like IMF and World Bank improves.  
Global Economic Coordination Council has a logic of its own, and it
should be pursued vigorously as an independent body of experts. It wouldTHE G20 AND RECOVERY AND BEYOND
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Economic Coordination Council.  
Briefly stated, G20 should be treated as a group of systemically important
countries which will deliberate on mechanisms by which the conflicts
between the policy space necessary for national governments which are
accountable to people and the normal global arrangements are resolved;
and, this is best done through dialogue and peer pressure. G20 should have
the liberty to draw on experts including, in particular, Global Economic
Coordination Council, apart from IMF and World Bank.  
However, it is necessary to ensure that G20 considers formally and
seriously the Report of the UN Commission of Experts, and takes a view on
its recommendations.  
In the light of the above, the review of the existing institutions should be
considered institution-wise, and with reference to weaknesses. In a way,
reform has to be incremental, but urgent and significant.  
My views on the G20 have been articulated in my recent book titled
“Global Crisis, Recession and Uneven Recovery”, in Chapter 20 (G20
Framework: Review and Prospects). Soft copy is attached.  
Reforming the Monetary and Financial System 
On the global reserve system, the longer term goal should be a global
currency. In the meantime, every effort should be made to make SDR
popular, while the multi polar reserve currency appears inevitable in the
short run, with U.S. Dollar continuing to be dominant but possibly less
than before.  
However, it may be useful to note that the real issue is not demand due to
forex reserves of governments, because it is possible for major reserve
currency holders to agree to mimick the currency composition of SDR in
their reserve management.  
In regard to the financial sector regulation, the major issue is the cross
border activities of the financial conglomerates and the cross border flows.
This area has been entirely neglected by the current discussions.  
The utilization of regulation of financial sector for financial stability is
emphasized, but not for promoting growth. This imbalance should be
rectified by focusing on instruments of regulatory policies that can
facilitate growth, including, in particular, employment and financial
inclusion.  
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avoid excessive financialisation and distorted incentives. Global
agreement on taxation can be independently pursued.  
Macroeconomic and Stability Issues 
In analyzing the macroeconomic and stability issues, it must be
recognized that growth and stability are essentially the subject matters of
elected governments at the national level, since they are accountable to
their people. All global institutions are in the nature of arrangements
between the national governments. Hence, any approach to the global
macro economic and stability issues should focus on the spill-over effects
of national policies on the global economy, and in particular, spill over
effects of those countries which are issuing reserve currencies and those
countries which are contributing to global economic imbalances.  
In this regard, the importance of Euro Area should be recognized by the
global community and it should be supported in resolving what has been
eloquently described as “Policy trilemmas”. Euro Area has the potential to
contribute immensely to the global architecture and governance reform.  
The Development Agenda
In analyzing the issues relating to development, particularly of
developing economies, the follow basic issues may be addressed.  
– First, globalization of finance is different from globalization of trade.  
– Second, financial markets are different from the markets in goods.  
– Third, banks among financial institutions are different and are in the
nature of public utilities.  
– Fourth, some financial instruments are good and some others are toxic.
The burden of poof that they are not toxic should be on the markets.  
– Fifth, the depositors’ interest and savers’ interest should be supreme
because in the final analysis, growth has to be funded essentially by
domestic savings and foreign savings are only a supplement.  
The most critical issue for developing countries in the near to medium-
term relates to volatilities and uncertainties in the financial markets. In
addition, the huge demands of public debt by the advanced economies on
the global savings and their budget constraints affecting aid flows could
cumulatively create a stress on the assured availability of both private and
public sector capital flows to the developing world.  Some firm assurances
to provide comfort in this regard may be essential for many of the low
income countries.  






International monetary and financial system
(i) New Breton wood Conference
Several key countries’ (U.S, Europe, Japan, China, India) representatives
should be convened to discuss a new system of international monetary
regime. U.S. dollar would continue to be the major transaction currency
but some mechanism needs to be created to strengthen smooth
transactions. Additional increase in SDR allocation with substantial
quantity should be one of the measures to be implemented.
(ii) Dollar vs. Asian Currencies
Given relative economic conditions between U.S. and Asian countries,
the U.S. dollar would continue to decline vis-à-vis Asian currency including
Chinese Yuan and Japanese Yen. Discussions among countries concerned
should be held to smooth out the process. In particular, confrontation
between U.S. and China over currency issues should be avoided as much as
possible.
G20 Process
Inner circle of G20 should be created to make discussions and
deliberation more effective. Core members should be five to six. Members
could form five to six groups and representation for the group could be on
rotating basis. A secretariat should be created that serves for five years or so
and the secretariat should be selected from aforementioned five to six
groups. After the first five years, the secretariat should change. TheTHE G20 AND RECOVERY AND BEYOND
THE G20 AND RECOVERY AND BEYOND138secretariat should get in touch with the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO
to obtain their support.
Macroeconomic and stability issues
(i) A new forum could be created to coordinate monetary and forex
policies. In particular, a tripartite forum among U.S, Europe and Japan
should meet and discuss regularly to avoid competitive monetary easing
and currency war.
(ii) IMF consultations with developed countries could be held more
frequently, say, a few times a year and on the basis of such consultations,
meetings among developed countries, U.S, Europe and Japan should be
convened.
(iii) Also, meeting with China and India with developed countries could
be held regularly with IMF as the secretariat.




In the year 2000, the international community agreed the Millennium
Development Goals (MDG), a set of fundamental, binding goals for a
sustainable and equitable development policy. The Millennium Summit
marked the start of a discussion on financing the necessary measures which
was continued at the International Conference on Financing for
Development in the Mexican city of Monterrey in 2002. At the Monterrey
Conference, developing and industrialised countries looked for the first
time at all the conceivable sources of financing for development. In the
Monterrey Consensus they agreed to increase official development
assistance (ODA), generate more foreign direct investment, mobilise
domestic financial resources in developing countries and reduce
international trade barriers. They also agreed a debt relief initiative and
sought greater involvement on the part of developing countries in the
reform of the international trade and finance architecture and in the
planning of international development cooperation. The Doha
Declaration of December 2008 reaffirmed the Monterrey Consensus in its
entirety and highlighted certain new areas of concern. The outcome
document contains the renewed commitment to mobilise all possible
financial resources to achieve the internationally agreed development
goals and to eradicate poverty. The Member States of the European Union
pledged in 2005 to increase spending on official development assistance to
0.51 per cent of gross national income (GNI) by 2010 and to 0.7 per cent of
GNI by 2015 on the basis of a phased plan. New Member States which
joined the EU after 2002 are committed to achieving a quota of 0.33 per
cent of GNI by 2015. 
During the economic and financial crisis, the industrialised countries
introduced stabilisation programmes to strengthen their economic andTHE G20 AND RECOVERY AND BEYOND
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gradually reducing their debt levels. This could well have an impact on the
amount they spend on development assistance. Any such cutback in
official development assistance would lead to a shortfall in funds for such
urgent tasks as the worldwide fight against poverty and climate change.
One serious consequence of this would be a loss of confidence on the part
of developing countries in the industrialised countries since the latter have
failed to keep their promises. This in turn could lead to hunger riots and
growing crises. The interim assessment of progress towards achievement of
the Millennium Development Goals at the follow-up conference in New
York in September 2010 reflected these concerns. The conference identified
progress in the areas of education and the control of HIV/Aids, malaria and
other transmittable diseases, resulting in part from the work of the Global
Fund. Little progress has been made, however, in reducing child mortality
and improving the health of mothers.  
While private finance initiatives have certainly achieved some
noteworthy successes, their limitations have also become clear. In times of
crisis there is a great danger that private companies acting as financial
backers will withdraw from a country and prevent the establishment of a
sustainable system to finance development. Private companies have
actually done this even in relation to microfinance institutions.   
The industrialised countries must keep their 0.7 per cent promise. One
way they can do so is by increasing budgets. But there is also a need to
identify innovative sources of financing if the Millennium Development
Goals are to be achieved on time and in full. The financial transactions tax
offers a good way to enforce the "speculator pays" principle and ensure that
the financial services industry share the costs of the crisis.  
Many European countries have now announced their support for a tax
on financial transactions. Every effort must therefore be made to ensure a
positive outcome at the next G20 round – if necessary in association with
the group of those countries which would like to take a leading role during
the implementation phase of such a tax. The financial sector must do its
part to tackle the aftermath of the financial crisis. A tax of this nature
would discourage short-term transactions and at the same time mobilise
billions globally for the fight against hunger, poverty, joblessness and
climate change. 
In addition to increasing ODA and introducing a financial transactions
tax, it is also necessary for the developing countries to boost their own
incomes. They must be given assistance to establish their own tax systems
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revenue.   
The financing of development must at the same time be part of a
worldwide growth strategy which seizes the opportunity to establish stable
and sustainable markets. Industry should make a contribution to
sustainability in the form of global green investments. 
Cooperation agreements between the industrialised countries and new
donor countries such as China, India, Brazil and other developing
countries can be used to exchange know-how and financial resources and
to work together towards the achievement of the Millennium
Development Goals. 
There is no lack of ideas as to where money for development cooperation
could come from. Rather, when budgets are cut and cooperation
agreements fail to materialise, this is more a demonstration of a lack of
political will. We should not allow ourselves to go down in history as the
generation which spent billions on bailing out the financial sector but did
not have the strength or the will to save the world from hunger, poverty,
unemployment and climate change. 
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diverse group of individuals with the highest level of expertise in the 
subjects confronting the G20 and with a commitment to working to ensure 
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